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CHAPl'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Facial expressions are one of the most important 
nonverbal method of human communications (Ekman, 1982}. This 
is true for two reasons. First, facial expressions are the 
most frequently utilized method of nonverbal communication. 
secondly, facial expressions serve as spontaneous and 
frequent nonverbal reinforcers of behavior, potently shaping 
social actions without much notice. 
Recent research (Manda!, 1986; Walker, Marwit & Emory, 
1980) has suggested that there is a link between the ability 
to recognize facial expressions of emotion and a wide 
variety of clinical conditions. Most prominent is the link 
between this ability and schizophrenia (Muraki & Bates, 
1977; Rosenthal & Benowitz, 1986; Rosenthal, Hall, Dimatteo, 
Rogers, & Archer 1979). The reason for these deficits 
observed in schizophrenics are unclear. Research to date has 
simply been correlational, without causal hypotheses (Rosen-
thal & Benowitz, 1986). Presently, it is impossible to tell 
whether deficits in nonverbal processing contribute to the 
1 
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clinical condition of schizophrenia, are the end result of 
the disease, or are simply a concomitant. 
Any one of these relationships are possible and 
actually are not mutually exclusive. An inability to under-
stand nonverbal communications might put individuals at risk 
for schizophrenic behavioral syndromes. By not understanding 
the nuances of the social world, schizophrenic individuals 
might become progressively more isolative from social 
corroborative experiences. It is also possible that the 
clinical symptoms of schizophrenia, characterized by 
terrorizing perceptions, delusional thinking, and anxiety-
provoking social encounters (Taylor, 1981) could cause the 
schizophrenic individual to lose many types of nonverbal 
skills, perhaps because social contacts are .simply too 
terrifying. 
A third possibility exists in the causal relationship 
between affect recognition and schizophrenia. An organic 
condition could contribute to both schizophrenia and the 
inability to decode facial expressions. In this case, neuro-
psychological impairments related to schizophrenia would be 
the direct cause of facial affect recognition deficits that 
the literature suggests are found in schizophrenics. 
Considering the increasing evidence linking some types of 
schizophrenia (Golden, 1981; Zee & Weinberg, 1988) and many 
cases of affect agnosia (Cicone, Wapner & Gardner, 1980; 
3 
Ley, & Bryden, 1979;) to organic causes of known etiologies, 
this hypothesis deserves serious attention. 
To date, no one has examined whether deficits in schizo-
phrenics' inability to decode facial affects are due to 
cognitive or social problems related to their disease, or 
whether they instead can be explained by the numerous neuro-
psychological and neurological impairments that accompany 
schizophrenia. This dissertation examines schizophrenics 
with and without neuropsychological and neurological 
deficits to establish whether the comparative inability to 
decode facial affects found in this diagnostic group is 
directly related to neuropsychological deficits. To do 
this, six quasi-experimental groups were studied. These 
included three diagnostic categories: medical patients, 
depressed psychiatric patients (labeled as "affective 
patients" in this study) and schizophrenics. Furthermore, 
these groups were divided equally between individuals who 
showed clear evidence of neuropsychological or neurological 
deficits, and those who were neuropsychologically without 
such deficits. 
Affect recognition is clearly a complex phenomena. It 
involves additional processes other than those measured by 
simply being able to verbally label specific emotions. Some 
of these include categorizations of affect intensity, affect 
pleasantness, and subjective certainty associated with 
affect recognition (Mccown, Johnson & Austin, 1988). To date 
4 
only a handful of quasi-experimental studies have addressed 
these variables. A second goal of this dissertation is to 
serve as a preliminary study regarding the impact of schizo-
phrenia and neuropsychological functioning on perceptions of 
affect intensity and pleasantness, and on the subjective 
sense of certainty associated with facial affect recogni-
tion. 
Prior to a discussion regarding methods and findings, 
it is first necessary to review the rather lengthy litera-
ture on facial expressions of emotion. The literature on 
schizophrenia and affect recognition will be briefly 
reviewed. Finally, neuropsychological localization theories 
of schizophrenia and how they relate to impairment in 
facial affect recognition will be discussed. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Facial Affect Recognition Research 
Research Prior to The Twentieth Century 
Jordan (1969) has noted that during the pre-scientific 
age the study of facial expressions was a popular topic of 
many philosophers. These included Plato, Aristotle, Epicur-
us, St. Augustine, and Kant. However, Jordan points out the 
scientific study of facial affects is relatively new. 
Previous students of the face were primarily concerned with 
physiognomy and characterological traits that supposedly 
were discernable from facial appearances. 
The contemporary study of facial affect is often 
credited to Darwin (1872). Actually, its roots are more than 
a half century earlier. Charles Bell (1806/1928), an English 
physician, artist, and actor observed that certain facial 
muscles seem to have no function except to differentiate 
emotional expression. Unlike a canine, whose grimace 
prepares the creature for a rapid assault, humankind, 
according to Bell, was "endowed by the Creator with facial 
expressions serving no other purpose than to communicate 
5 
' t t' II emotional in en ion (p. 4). The purpose of human 
6 
facial 
affect, Bell concluded, is primarily to express emotions and 
nothing else. Piderit (1859), a German expatriot physician 
who lived most of his life in South America, also preceded 
oarwin in his study of facial expression. Pideri t was the 
first to recognize that certain emotional expressions were 
common across cultures. Previous physiognomists believed 
that certain facial affects were peculiar to French, the 
Europeans, the Africans. Piderit, through meticulous 
observation, established that both the degree, and the 
direction of muscular movement of facial affects was the 
same for individuals in every culture. Certain facial 
affects, he believed, were universal, an observation more 
extensively verified by Darwin (1872) several years later. 
Similarly, there seems to be relatively high concordance 
about their intensity across similar emotional situations in 
diverse cultures. 
Piderit disagreed with Bell's contention that affects 
were primarily "designed" for communicative purposes. 
Instead, he stated that each muscular function had an 
overriding utility in facilitating or inhibiting sensory 
perception. He labelled this principle the "maxim of 
emotional serviceability of facial affects". Each emotional 
expression, he argued, had a function closely tied to a 
corresponding sense organ. Disgust, for example, maximizes 
nostril closure, a useful adjunct for inhibiting noxious 
7 
odors. smiles allow maximal pressure of the front portions 
of the tongue against the roof of the mouth and teeth, 
thereby allowing sweet or pleasant tastes to be savored. 
Implicit in Piderit's belief was the assumption that 
facial expressions serve no major communicative function. 
Indeed, Piderit believed that most people barely attend to 
facial expressions. Those that do frequently do not properly 
identify them. Hence, facial affect recognition to Piderit 
was not an important human communicative capability. 
Darwin (1872) expanded Piderit's concept of "emotional 
serviceability" with his "principle of serviceable as-
sociated habits". Darwin believed that at one time in 
humankind's past facial affect expression had a practical 
survival function. Natural selection instilled them because 
of their usefulness. The importance of affects for present 
day survival was now reduced. However, facial expressions in 
humans have 
generalized to analogous situations. Although frequently 
present in humans, they are less important than in lesser 
mammals. Human facial affects lack the intensity and 
survival value seen in lower primates. 
Perhaps Darwin's greatest contribution (Ekman, Friesen, 
& Ellsworth, 1972) was to note that certain facial affects 
are indeed inborn and developmentally related. Even blind 
children grimace and smile, Darwin observed. Furthermore, 
children in every culture exhibit a similar repertoire of 
8 
facial expressions at similar ages. This suggests that 
facial expressions were an important survival mechanism, at 
least until recent years, when modern civilization seems to 
have mitigated the immediate need for such skill. 
Darwin was unclear about the inheritability of the 
understanding of facial expressions. Following Piderit, he 
also vacillated on the importance of affects for present day 
communicative purposes. In a classic experiment, Darwin 
(1872) took "obvious photographs of facial affect", most of 
which were reproductions of larger popular photographic 
pictures. Al though there was high agreement among his 2 O 
subjects about certain facial affects such as smiling and 
sadness, there was less agreement among his subjects for 
other expressions. From this small experiment, Darwin 
concluded three things: first, some expressions are easier 
to recognize than others. Secondly, individuals seem to 
differ in their capacity to correctly identify facial 
expressions. Third, certain situations tend to make facial 
affect recognition more ambiguous. 
Twentieth Century Facial Affect Research Prior to the 1970s. 
With the development of experimental psychology, interest 
in the study of facial affect recognition accelerated. 
Progress-if it is measured by scientific consensus-however, 
was exceedingly slow (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). 
Experimental designs and questions asked regarding facial 
9 
expressions varied greatly. Results from one laboratory 
would frequently be unreplicable in another. There was very 
little agreement on the degree to which humans· could 
correctly identify facial expressions. Simultaneous 
researchers were inadvertently asking dissimilar questions. 
An exhaustive review of conflicting early twentieth 
century research on facial affect recognition has been 
provided by Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972). Some 
outstanding examples of conflicting findings are apparent 
from the early literature. Langfeld (1918) was one of the 
first experimenters to systematically examine subjects' 
abilities to decode facial expression. He tested 11 
subjects on the ability to correctly identify posed actors' 
emotional states. Over 111 emotional labels were presented 
for each affect. Accuracy ranged from 17% for one subject 
to 58% for another. 
Furthermore, Langfeld found that subjects could readily 
be persuaded to endorse an emotional label incorrectly, even 
if they had previously correctly identified the same 
emotion. Langfeld interpreted these findings as indication 
of the general instability of the capacity for individuals 
to correctly identify facial affects. His conclusion was 
that other environmental cues are responsible for the 
process of attributing motives to facial expressions. 
Langfeld's experiment can be severely criticized. 
10 
Langfeld presented different faces, each one portraying a 
differing "emotion", or set of instructions to the actor who 
portrayed them. There was no evidence that actors correctly 
gortrayed these emotions. Furthermore Langfeld had no £ 
priori basis to claim that these subtle differences he used 
as stimulus labels ("playful interest" vs. pretended as-
tonishment", or "fury" vs. "sullen anger") corresponded to 
emotions commonly presented in real life situations. Lang-
feld's study showed only that his subjects had difficulty 
with the stimuli that he presented them, and that there were 
tremendous individual differences in these abilities despite 
what was certainly a large error variance. Indeed, with 111 
choices for each facial affect displayed, even the subject 
who identified only 17% of the stimuli correctly did so 
considerably above the chance level that Langfeld claims. 
The work of Feleky ( 1928) further reflects the con-
fusion that prevailed in the early research on facial affect 
recognition. Feleky asked a different question, used a 
different method, and came up with an altogether different 
view of human capacities to recognize facial expressions of 
emotion. Feleky suggested that while subjects might err in 
identical agreement of emotional expression, (that is, they 
might not use the same labels for particular presented 
affects) the direction of choice of affect labelling is 
similar for most people. Feleky had subjects rate 86 facial 
affects with any adjective they chose. These categories 
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were then collapsed into those that were logically similar. 
He found that if seven categories were allowed and equal 
intervals were assumed for each category, interrater 
reliability ranged from 80% to 92%, depending upon the 
emotion tested. These results are the opposite from those of 
Langfeld, who denied that humans could accurately recogn~ze 
facial expressions. 
A similar set of results to those of Feleky's was 
obtained by Kanner (1931). Subjects were asked to subjec-
tively select the "best word" to fit a description of facial 
displays. Categories were collapsed by expert judges, who 
maintained a high degree of interrater reliability for this 
task. Kanner concluded that there are essentially six 
emotional clusters which can be differentiated from each 
other. These include happiness, sadness, fear, surprise, 
anger, and disgust. 
Schlosberg (1954) found essentially the same emotional 
clusters by applying the technique of factor analysis to 
facial affect research. Schlosberg suggested that the over 
two hundred popular labels of facial expression could be 
reduced to six groups: happy, sad, fear, anger, surprise, 
and disgust. Remaining affects could be seen as a combina-
tion of these more basic six, just as chemical compounds are 
combinations of more basic elements. Dismay, for example is 
a combination of two more primary emotions, in this case 
anger and sadness. 
12 
on the other hand, a number of studies indicated that 
people cannot reliably recognize facial expressions (Fern-
berger, 1928). This led Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) to 
question whether the ability to consistently identify facial 
affects had ever been established within the laboratory, 
much less in the real world. Bruner and Tagiuri 's review 
article occurred in the same year that Schlosberg's factor 
analytic study was published. The former was published in 
widely read text. As Ekman et al. (1972) note, the results 
of this unfortunate coincidence was to discourage interest 
in facial affect recognition. While Schlosberg had shown 
that individuals can delineate the six basic affects 
consistently his research was mostly ignored for the next 
15 years.l 
The Work of Ekman and Friesen 
This trend was reversed almost single-handedly by the 
work of Paul Ekman and his associates. Ekman, Friesen and 
Ellsworth (1972) suggested that Schlosberg's six components 
1 A few exceptions were present. Frijda (1958) 
remained convinced that facial affect recognition was not 
reducible to situational context. VandenBerg and Mattson's 
(1961) work on affect recognition deficits in schizophrenics 
(discussed below) was published during this period. Abelson 
and Sermat (1962) devised a multi-dimensional scaling 
procedure for ratings of faces that continues to be popular 
to this day. Davitz (1964) edited a volume on communica-
tion of emotional meaning. Haggard and Isaacs (1966) even 
suggested that facial affects could be used as a variable in 
psychotherapy research. However, most of the important 
studies on facial expression were confined to Europe (Noum-
menna, 1964; Osgood, 1966; VandenBerg & Mattson, 1961), 
rather than to the more behaviorally oriented American laboratories. 
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could be used to establish reliably interpretable test 
stimuli for measuring the ability to decode facial expres-
sion. In a reanalysis of all of the major studies conducted 
on the ability to decode facial expression, Ekman et al. 
concluded that subjects could indeed make context indepen-
dent and reliable judgments of emotional affect. This was 
true if the following conditions were met: Test stimuli were 
photographic, rather than artistically drawn (as previous 
studies of Fernberger (1928) and other had been) , and, 
test stimuli were restricted to the six major affects 
described by Schlosberg (1954). 
As Ekman et al. note, reliability of test instruments is 
a serious problem with facial affect research. This 
difficulty has been responsible for a great deal of the 
inconsistent findings in facial affect recognition litera-
ture. Candid photographs of unposed emotions-an early 
popular stimulus utilized by Darwin and others-are difficult 
to obtain and portend legal and ethical boondoggles. Actors 
instructed to pose emotions have had no criteria to judge 
their own success of facial accuracy. Artists' renditions of 
affect are equally handicapped without an objective criter-
ia. Ekman and his associates attempted to solve this 
problem by constructing an objective measure of facial 
expression that could be used to validate subsequent 
emotional test stimuli. Their solution, the Facial Affect 
Scoring Technique (FAST) is based on the objective measure-
ment of patterns of muscle covariation. 
14 
Numerical deter-
minants from the system are used to classify the degree of 
accuracy with which a particular actor or model has por-
trayed a particular primary emotion. 
Utilizing this scoring system, Ekman and Friesen (1976) 
examined several thousand photographs of models portraying 
facial expressions. Those with the highest validity, as 
established by the FAST were included in a large study of 
reliability. Expressions from models that had the highest 
test/retest and interrater reliability were included as the 
111 slides in Ekman and Friesen's (1976) Basic Affect 
Recognition Test. In general, the interrater reliability of 
individual facial stimuli is quite high, ranging from . 97 
for female models portraying smiling to . 73 for several 
models portraying the affect of disgust. To date, the Basic 
Affect Recognition Test is the only empirically reliable 
measure of facial affect recognition dedicated solely to 
facial decoding. 
Individual Differences in Affect Recognition 
Accuracy 
Most of the research in the twentieth century has 
attempted to establish the universality of facial affect 
recognition across cultures. Having done this researchers 
have attempted to examine individual differences in these 
abilities in greater detail. Actually, the foundations for 
this effort began during the 1920s. 
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F. Allport (1924) 
tested the hypothesis that the ability to recognize facial 
affects was improvable through practice. He found ·that a 
group of college women showed a small but meaningful 
increase in the ability to recognize facial expressions 
after a lecture on facial anatomy. More importantly, he 
found substantial, and rather consistent individual dif-
ferences in the ability to recognize facial affects both 
before and after the treatment intervention of the lecture. 
Guilford (1929) repeated a portion of this experiment 
with more systematic training provided to subjects. He 
found considerable individual difference in the ability to 
recognize 96 poses of facial expression. With training, the 
least successful subjects could be brought up to slightly 
below the mean level of the most successful subjects. 
Further training did not help the successful subjects. 
Guilford believed that the results of this study had two 
implications. First, training teaches the less accurate 
subjects which areas of facial expression to attend to in 
decoding affect. Secondly, training seems to increase 
motivation to do well on this task. In retrospect, the most 
important finding of this study was ignored; even normal 
subjects show broad differences in their pre-intervention 
abilities to decode facial expressions. 
16 
Qualitative Approaches to Affect Recognition 
All but about a dozen of the studies of affect recogni-
tion have used a dependent variable of a frequency count of 
the numbers of facial affects correctly decoded (Johnson & 
Mccown, submitted). In the typical study, such as that done 
by Mccown, Johnson, Austin, and Shefsky (in press) groups 
are shown facial expressions of emotion, usually in 
randomized order. Mean differences between groups of 
clinical or theoretical interest are then analyzed, general-
ly for aggregate numbers of total errors of facial affect 
recognition. 
This type of experiment has the advantage that it is 
relatively easy to implement and replicate. Furthermore, 
data analysis is straightforward, 
_/ 
and unless there is a 
theoretical reason to suggest that a prior differences in 
affect recognition exist for certain types of facial expres-
sions, the increase in power that such a broad test seems to 
offer suggests a strong utility for the above "shotgun" 
approach. However, this sort of "fishing net" affords no 
information about particular emotions that might be prob-
lematic for particular groups. A more sophisticated approach 
is sometimes indicated if such questions arise. 
The idea of categorical errors extends at least from 
F.eleky (1928), who suggested that normal individuals err in 
the same general "direction". The importance of categories 
of errors has frequently been ignored in the literature. The 
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previous type of facial affect recognition task examined the 
dependent measure of accuracy facial expressions as a 
function of correct naming. If the subject identif.ies an 
angry face as a happy one he is "no more wrong" than if he 
identifies an angry face as a disgusted one, emotions that 
seem more intuitively similar than happiness and anger. 
The type of research with accuracy of affect naming as 
• 
the sole dependent variable has been criticized in the 
literature for failing to reflect the subtlety in affect 
judgment (Mandal, 1986). A most thorough discussion of the 
necessity for an alternative to "mere accuracy" as the sole 
dependent variable has been made by Mccown, Johnson and 
Austin (1988). These authors note that all mistakes in 
identifying specific facial expressions are not necessarily 
equally deleterious. Errors made in emotional affect 
recognitions involving substitutions with similar emotions 
are probably not too serious. 
Drawing on Feleky's (1928) notion of patterns of errors 
they note that little is lost in normal social interchange 
if a person receiving the emotional expression-the decoder--
makes errors that are congruent with the direction of the 
emotion presented. An example is helpful in illustrating 
this point. Consider if the decoder confuses happiness with 
feelings of pleasant surprise. In this case the decoder has 
been able to decipher the encoder's mood trend of experienc-
ing a pleasant feeling, while not being able to actually 
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label the specific emotion. Similarly, a person who consis-
tently confuses anger and sadness would experience only 
slight social impairedness. He or she would sense that the 
encoder-the person presenting the emotion-was dysphoric. 
While the name of the particular emotion, and indeed its 
nuances, might escape the decoder, the general mood state of 
the encoder would not be missed. 
It seems important, therefore that research go beyond a 
simple tally of numbers of affects perceived incorrectly, 
and instead examine patterns of errors made in facial affect 
recognition. Simply, some patterns of errors would logically 
seem to be more serious than others. Discussion of whether 
recognition cluster around similar 
reliable underlying dimensions of 
errors of emotional 
emotions presupposes 
similarity. 
Pleasantness/Unpleasantness 
Several such dimensions have been suggested by Schlos-
burg (1954), including that of pleasantness/unpleasantness. 
Past research has found this dimension to be very stable 
(Osgood, 1966), even across different cultures (Noummena, 
1964) • At least three types of methods are possible in 
studying this dimension. 
Mccown, Johnson, & 
errors in their study 
delinquents. If neutral 
analysis of errors that 
Austin (1988) utilized types of 
of patterns of errors made by 
expressions are included in the 
are logically possible, as they 
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would be in daily face-to-face interactions, there are eight 
possible types of errors based on the pleasantness/un-
pleasantness dimension. Mccown, et al. found that · delin-
quents were more likely that other youths to make more 
errors of interpreting unpleasant emotions from pleasant 
facial affect stimuli. The hypothesis that this represents 
some type of psychodyanamic "anti-people" projection, 
however, has to be questioned since delinquents are more 
likely to rate neutral affects as both pleasant and un-
pleasant. The authors admit they are perplexed what these 
findings mean, suggesting that perhaps delinquents have 
difficulty in emotionally ambiguous situations, and try to 
impart affect or intention in others when none is there. 
An alternative approach to rating affect pleasantness 
that does not involve the clumsiness of the dimensional 
analysis of Mccown et al. is advocated by Manda! (1986). 
Mandal has each subject rate individual expressions for 
their degree of resemblance to a pleasant face. Post hoc 
determinations of dimensions are found by factor analysis, 
providing numerous comparisons and ratings are made. This 
latter requirement is a handicap making it less appropriate 
for extended clinical research with impaired populations. 
A third approach is more straightforward, though has 
appeared rarely in the literature. Subjects simply rate the 
affects on a Likert type scale for their assessment of 
affect pleasantness. This is a convenient and easily 
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understood procedure that promises to be more conducive to 
investigation with difficult populations, such as the 
medically ill or the chronically schizophrenic. 
Intensity 
Pideret ( 1858) was the first to consider cultural and 
individual differences in intensities of emotional displays. 
Additional interest in this area awaited Schlosburg (1954), 
who found the dimension of affect intensity to be orthogonal 
to perceived pleasantness /unpleasantness. Schlosburg 
suggests facial affects differ in their degree of intensity, 
and that perceived intensities cause the degree of response 
to the particular e~otion that is displayed. This suggests 
the corollary that individual's perceptions of identical 
stimuli might also differ regarding how intensely they 
subjectively believe facial affects are being portrayed. 
To date, no one has examined whether individuals differ 
in subjectively perceived intensity of experiencing facial 
expression as a function of either aspects of personality or 
of membership in a diagnostic subgroups. This is a surpris-
ing gap in the literature. Clinically, a frequent observa-
tion is that an expression that appears to one person as 
slight bother appears to yet another as gross outrage. or, 
what appears to be a pleasant smile to one person appears to 
be ebullience to another. It not difficult to imagine a host 
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of personality factors and learning histories that might 
influence an individual's perceptions of affect intensity. 
one example is familial history. Halberstadt · ( 1983) 
found that people from expressive and emotional families 
were less accurate in decoding facial affects, presumably 
because of not learning to attend to subtle cues. It also 
seems that individual variations in perceived intensity 
might relate to dominant psychological themes present in the 
individual at time of stimulus presentation. Just as on the 
Rorschach, where the absence of color indicates a degree of 
emotional constriction, (Exner, 1978) the absence of the 
evaluation of particular emotional stimuli as intense when 
other individuals rated it as so could serve as an indicator 
of personality processes. This would seem to be fertile 
ground for future researchers which has been ignored by the 
present generation of facial affect studies. 
Subjective Certainty 
On the basis of his research with delinquent youths, the 
author and his colleagues (Mccown, Johnson, & Austin, 1988) 
have suggested that a major variable of interest for affect 
recognition researchers might be individual differences in 
subjective sense of certainty of judgment associated with 
emotional perception. Relying on the concept of corrective 
feedback loops, Mccown et al. argue that delinquents might 
lack the ability to seek confirmational evidence of their 
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subjective impressions of emotional situations. Simply, they 
might be unjustifiably too certain of the particular meaning 
of a perceived emotion. They then might react inapprop·riate-
ly on the basis of this too hasty attribution, and be 
unable to subsequently modify this misattribution. 
To date, few researchers have examined subjective 
certainty of judgment of emotional expressions. Excessive 
certainty of affect judgment could easily be as pathognomic 
as consistent misattribution. In many situations affect 
information is not complete. Individuals insisting upon 
making judgments in these conditions would demonstrate a de 
facto error rate in real life situations that would probably 
impair their overall social functioning. 
In summary, then, a number of tasks seem of use in 
examining individual differences between groups regarding 
the ability to decode facial expressions. Research might 
wish to begin with an aggregate tally of total errors, and 
then examine either patterns of errors or ratings of 
pleasantness and intensity associated with each emotion. 
Researchers might wish to examine individual differences in 
subjects' perceptions of affect intensity. Finally, 
experimenters might wish to examine differences in subjects' 
subjective perceptions of their own degrees of certainty 
regarding these emotions presented as stimuli. Indi victual 
differences with clinical significance might be observable 
in any of these areas. 
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Facial Affect Recognition Deficits and Schizophrenia. 
Accuracy of Emotional Recognition 
A persistent finding throughout the literature has been 
that schizophrenics show impairment in ability to decode 
facial expressions of emotion (Manda!, 1986; Rosenthal & 
Bekowitz, 1986). These studies have been reviewed for meta-
analysis (Johnson & Mccown, submitted) . Eighteen of the 
studies found in the literature used a dependent variable of 
affect recognition alone. No study to date has examined 
subjective assessments of intensity or surety of judgment in 
schizophrenics and normal subjects. The study utilizing a 
multidimensional scaling task did so by showing pictures of 
affects and asking schizophrenics and normals to rate test 
stimuli on a degree of similarity with the affects being 
presented previously. In this manner, verbal labels were 
avoided (Mandal, 1986), although to date there is no clear 
indication that such a procedure presented any experimental 
advantage over a procedure which simply asked subjects to 
rate emotions with verbal labels without the anchoring 
stimuli being presented. 
In the majority of studies schizophrenics showed a 
deficit. This comparative deficit has important ramifica-
tions for those working with schizophrenics: to the extent 
that schizophrenics are relatively immune to recognition of 
nonverbal communication, therapy with these patients would 
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need to rely on purely verbal and behavioral interventions, 
rather than on the typical emotional nuances that categorize 
the successful bond in a therapeutic experience. Further-
more, therapists attempting a psychosocial rehabilitation of 
schizophrenics would maximally ensure effective interven-
tions only if they addressed these comparative deficits in 
nonverbal communication perception. 
Pleasantness 
Mandal ( 1986) has examined the dimension of pleasant-
ness/unpleasantness. In this study, it was found that 
schizophrenics rated pleasant emotions as less pleasant, 
suggesting that schizophrenia involves deficits in hedonic 
attribution, as well as simply a thought disorder. Interest-
ingly, unpleasant faces were not rated as less unpleasant, 
as would be expected if a mere reduction in variance were 
due simply to schizophrenia. Schizophrenics just seemed to 
dislike pleasant faces more than normals. 
This is a finding explainable by the general personality 
paradigm of Eysenck and Eysenck (1985). They argue that a 
common personality core in schizophrenics and criminals is 
the original diathesis for schizophrenia. While not neces-
sarily the precipitant cause of the full-blown syndrome, 
this factor of personality, labelled Psychoticism, or "P" 
appears to be strongly linked with a genetically based 
predisposition towards schizophrenia. "P", a factor analytic 
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construct loads heavily on personality traits that show a 
comparative antipathy for human tenderness and kindness, 
including a dislike and distrust of more pleasant motives of 
others. Additionally, P loads highly on items tapping 
hostile and oppositional thinking. Individuals with a "high 
P" have more negative attitudes towards those around them. 
since schizophrenics are score at the high end of the 
distribution on the personality factor of P, it would be 
expected that they would rate pleasant faces of emotion as 
less pleasant • 
. subjective Level of Intensity 
No studies to date have examined the subjective level of 
ascribed intensity to facial expressions by schizophrenics 
as compared to ratings made by normal subjects. 2 There is 
literature consensus that schizophrenia is related to a 
"loosening of boundaries" and a deficit in perceiving the 
environment in a manner that others do (Andreasen, 1985; 
Exner, 1978). With this onset of a schizophrenic syndrome 
2 What comparisons could have existed would be invalid 
under today's psychiatric nomenclature. The current Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual, III, Revised (American Psychiat-
ric Association, 1987) and earlier diagnostic manual DSM-III 
have relabeled acute and reactive schizophrenia (popular 
diagnoses until the mid 1970s) as "schizophreniform 
disorder". This entity is specifically excluded as being a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Consequently, there has been a 
narrowing of the definition of schizophrenia to include only 
what has been typically thought of as chronic or process 
schizophrenia. Because of this, great care needs to be made 
in citing literature published before the utilization of 
DSM-III. 
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comes the tendency for thought and judgment to become more 
idiosyncratic and less stimulus based. It might be expected 
that no particular direction in ratings of affect intensity 
by schizophrenics would emerge. Instead, it would be 
expected that schizophrenics would manifest more variance 
compared with non schizophrenics, since their responses are 
based less on stimulus characteristics and more on idiogra-
phic and illogical factors. An analogy with projective tests 
is useful here. Patients with schizophrenia have more 
atypical responses than normal subjects, simply because they 
are not bound by adequate reality testing (Exner, 1978). 
Affect Certainty 
Affect certainty is another area that . has not been 
explored with schizophrenics. According to Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1985) schizophrenia is characterized by a psychotic 
personality core composed of dogmatic inflexibility and a 
difficulty in toleration for other points of view. If this 
is true, then we might see more subjective certainty of 
facial affect stimuli by schizophrenics. Schizophrenics 
would be less likely to hold such judgments in abeyance by 
rating them as less sure. Normal subjects should approach 
their task with a greater degree of possible ambivalence, 
and because they remain flexible about being corrected 
should show less subjective certainty of ratings for facial 
expressions of emotion. 
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Laboratory data relevant to this hypothesized finding is 
furnished by Claridge (1981). Claridge has found that 
schizophrenics tend to attenuate large portions of ex-
perimentally presented stimuli. Once they "lock in" on a 
portion of the stimuli they have difficulty processing 
information from other sources. Furthermore, DSM-III 
schizophrenics demonstrate mental inflexibility and dif-
ficulty in "set shifting" (Seeman, 1985), that seems to have 
persisted despite the changing criteria regarding which 
patients are presently classified as schizophrenics. 
In an unpublished study Duncan and Mccown (submitted) 
examined the Eysencks' personality variable of Psychoticism 
and its impact on the construct of affect certainty. In an 
outpatient psychiatric setting, 21 patients of mixed 
diagnoses attending group therapy sessions were administered 
the Psychoticism scale of the Personality Inventory, 
Revised (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). Subjects were 
then shown 12 different facial expressions of emotion, one 
for each of the primary affects (happy, sad, anger, fear, 
surprise and disgust) portrayed by a male and female. 
Subjects were then asked to rate each of their judgments on 
a 10 point scale for certainty, with one being simply a 
guess and 10 being absolute certitude. A mean rating of 
affect certainty was obtained by averaging each person's 
ratings. These averages were found to correlate .34 with the 
Psychoticism scale. Since the Psychoticism scale is elevated 
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in schizophrenics (Eysenck et al., 1985) such a finding 
would probably be more pronounced with individuals with a 
schizophrenic diagnosis. No one has tested such a hypothesis 
directly. 
on the other hand, one study with DSM-II schizophrenics 
have suggested that schizophrenics are less consistent and 
certain of their overall interpersonal judgment of others 
(Livesay, 1981). Whether this applies to DSM-III schizo-
phrenia, 
judgment 
and whether it extends to the molecular social 
of facial affect recognition is an empirical 
question needing research. 
Schizophrenia, Affect Recognition, and 
Neuropsycholoqical Deficits 
Hemispheric Dysfunction 
It is widely believed that the ability to decode affect 
is localized to the right parietal lobes in left dominant 
hemispheric individuals (Cicone, Wapner, & Gardner, 1980; 
Dekosky, Heilman, Bowers, & Valenstein, 1980; Ley & Bryden, 
1979); Brain damaged individuals with impairment in this 
area show two deficits. 
tests of facial affect 
facial affects as less 
people (Etcoff, 1983). 
First, they are less accurate on 
recognition. Secondly, they rate 
pleasant than non brain damaged 
Schizophrenics' behavior on tasks of nonverbal informa-
tion processing is relatively indistinguishable from 
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patients with right hemispheric damage 3. A meta-analysis of 
studies of affect recognition deficits (Johnson & Mccown, 
submitted) shows a similar effect size of the effects of 
right hemispheric damage on facial affect recognition as is 
found with schizophrenia. What is anomalous about this 
behavioral concordance is that schizophrenia is thought to 
be related to general left hemispheric, and particularly 
left frontal lobe deficits (Seemen, 1985), rather than to 
right parietal dysfunction as the neuropsychological 
evidence from affect recognition studies would seem to 
indicate. 
To date, the preponderance of evidence suggests 
strongly that many schizophrenics show dominant hemispheric 
brain dysfunction (Andreasen, 1985). This evidence exists 
on several different theoretical and empirical levels. 
Since schizophrenia is thought to be a diseases of language 
and reasoning ability it is theoretically logical that it 
should localize to areas of the brain responsible for 
receptive speech and logical functioning, the left hemi-
sphere. And if this is true, schizophrenia should not 
normally include other symptoms that would indicate right 
brain dysfunctioning. 
3 Hemispheric lateralizations are used throughout this 
dissertation in reference to the typical, right handed, left 
dominant individual, who composes approximately 85% of the 
population (Taylor, 1981). 
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In general this is the case. Rarely, will schizophren-
ics hallucinate spatial distortions that would indict the 
right hemispheric functions (Taylor, 1981) . On the other 
hand, as Taylor notes, dementias and acute brain syndromes 
("course brain disease" or "organic brain syndromes") will 
display visual and spatial hallucinations not usually found 
in schizophrenia. Consequently, schizophrenia is believed 
to be a disease primarily of the left hemisphere. 
A second argument concerns data from neuropsychological 
tests. Until recently, the literature on lateralized 
deficits in schizophrenics observed from neuropsychological 
or performances tests was not large. In general, neurop-
sychological evidence weakly supported the belief that 
schizophrenics have left brain impairment, particularly left 
frontal impairment (Golden, 1981; Taylor, 1981). The results 
were not unequivocal; for example, schizophrenics have 
poorer performance I.Q.s on the WAIS than do non-schizo-
phrenics (Wechsler, 1958). However, the comprehension 
subtest of the WAIS, a particularly localized left frontal 
function (Golden, 1981) is especially depressed in schizo-
phrenics. 
A rather extensive literature has developed in the last 
10 years indicating that at least one large subgroup of 
schizophrenics do remarkably poorly on tests that tap left 
frontal lobe functioning (Goldberg, Weinberger, Berman, 
Pliskin & Podd, 1988; Silverstein, 1988; Zee & Weinberger, 
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1988) . On tests such as the Wisconsin Card Sort-a test 
extremely sensitive to left frontal lobe functioning, and 
involving hypothesis testing and set shifting-schizophrenics 
patients make significantly more errors than any type of 
control group (medical, affective, etc.) Furthermore, 
patients often continue to perseverate despite instructions, 
and a demonstrated capacity to grasp the contingencies of 
reinforcement and rule changes. These types of studies 
suggest that at least one type of schizophrenia is categor-
ized by profound left frontal lobe changes involving a 
genuine dementia including a dissociation between knowledge 
and the ability to make use of this knowledge for gainful 
action (Goldberg et al., 1988). 
The literature is clear regarding the findings of 
organic deficits in schizophrenics that localize to the left 
frontal lobes, in particular, and to the left side in 
general. However, this literature is not causal. A number 
of factors could cause neurological and organic deficits in 
schizophrenics including bad diet, bad living conditions, 
substance abuse, medication, and even stress from the 
disease itself. Regardless, a number of different, and not 
necessarily mutually exclusive explanations and behavioral 
correlates of this hypothesized deficit have been advanced 
or observed. These shall be discussed on the basis of their 
relative strengths in present day literature. 
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The first is that schizophrenics show less dense gray 
matter in the dominant hemisphere, as measured from CT 
scans. These findings have been reported by one laboratory 
(Golden, 1981), and replicated by another (Andreasen, 1985). 
This would mean that schizophrenia is related to a relative 
absence of left cortical gray matter. Schizophrenics simply 
have less necessary brain tissue in these regions. 
schizophrenic deficits in left frontal tasks are also 
related to decreased regional cerebral blood flow, as 
measured by radioactive scintillation techniques. Results 
have rather consistently shown small but significant dif-
ferences in dominant cerebral blood flow levels between 
schizophrenics and control patients (Franzen & Ingvar, 
1975; Ingvar & Franzen, 1974). Brain impairment, even 
necrosis of gray matter would be a possible outcome of this 
lack of adequate blood supply, compared with non schizo-
phrenics. It is notable that these deficits do not appear to 
have been found elsewhere in the brains of schizophrenics 
outside of the left frontal lobes. 
Enlarged frontal ventricles of left frontal lobes of 
schizophrenics have also been reported in the literature 
(Golden, Moses, Zelazowski, Graber, Zatz, Horvarth, & 
Berger, 1980; Weinberger, Torrey, Neophytides & Wyatt, 
1979). Since such enlargement is almost always evidence of 
lobe atrophy (with the ventricles filling in the space that 
the shrinking lobes once occupied) this is strong evidence 
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of permanent cerebral changes secondary to or the cause of 
schizophrenia. Golden's group further found that the amount 
of ventricle enlargement, and hence atrophy, was predic-
table from the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery 
(described below). This rather remarkable finding links 
behavioral performance to physiological processes associated 
in schizophrenia, and suggests that an organic etiology may 
have been found for at least one subtype of schizophrenia. 
Another relevant organic deficit postulated to 
separate schizophrenics from others is differences in 
ability of the corpus callosum to transmit information 
between hemispheres of the brain. While not a left hemis-
pheric problem directly such a deficit implicates severe 
hemispheric dysfunctioning that might render the dominant 
hemisphere incapable of performing its functions adequately. 
The corpus callosum is a bundle of neural fibers that seem 
to act as the gateway between hemispheres. Either a poorly 
developed or too well developed fiber track could provide 
difficulty associated with transmission of cortical informa-
tion. Bigelow, Nasrallah, and Rauscher (1983) have presented 
autopsy evidenced suggesting that the corpus callosa of 
schizophrenics is often enlarged. As Andreasen (1985) notes 
aberrant corpus callosa would result in a case where the two 
hemispheres were not able to communicate well with one 
another, resulting in a decay of information processing en 
route to dr from the dominant hemisphere. These., authors 
' ,.:. ··~\ -- ' 
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believe that this hypothesized process could easily fit the 
clinical picture of schizophrenia. 
In summary there are a number of hypothesized observa-
tions and explanations concerning the comparative deficit 
of the dominant hemisphere in schizophrenia. Regardless of 
the hypothesized cause of the deficit there seems reasonable 
evidence that at least a portion of schizophrenics demon-
strate dominant hemispheric dysfunction of some type, with 
some type of organic brain involvement (Andreasen, 1985; 
Seeman, 1985) • This would result in a wide variety of 
neuropsychological deficits, with schizophrenics generally 
demonstrating superiority of right hemispheric functioning 
over left. What is surprising then, is that facial affect 
deficits of schizophrenics resemble those encountered in 
patients with right brain dysfunction. This contradiction 
would seem to beg for an explanation, of which one of 
several are possible. 
Language Deficit and Motivation Hypothesis. 
This explanation is rather straightforward. It states 
that although schizophrenics might be able to be as accurate 
as normals in facial affect recognition, they either are 
uncooperative in experimental tasks, or lack language skills 
to express what they are perceiving. The first part of this 
hypothesis, lack of cooperation, is always a possibility. 
Rapport with schizophrenics is difficult to obtain, and such 
a hypothesis is probably impossible to completely refute. 
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Language deficits and instructional difficulties are 
not a likely candidate for the cause of comparative in-
abilities of schizophrenics to decode facial expressions. 
Mandal (1986) gave schizophrenics a multidimensional scaling 
procedure, asking them to discriminate degrees of simila-
rities among emotional faces. Even without language labels 
of primary emotions, schizophrenics still showed compara-
tive deficits. Similar target emotions were judged less 
similar than those judged by depressed patients or non-
patients. Opposite emotions were also judged less distant. 
Mandal concludes that schizophrenic emotional processing 
deficits are not a function of language difficulties but 
appear to be due to genuine errors in discrimination 
ability. 
Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer, and Walker (1986) utilized 
four different affect recognition tests with schizophrenics. 
Two of these tests did not involve verbal labelling, but 
instead consisted of various matching tasks of stimuli with 
each other. In all four tests schizophrenics showed compara-
tive inabilities with other psychiatric patients. This 
suggests against the hypothesis that schizophrenics show a 
comparative inability to decode facial expression primarily 
because of verbal deficits. 
A Coincidence Hypothesis 
The second possible explanation is that the results are 
coincidental. A different and poorly understood process 
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causes schizophrenics to fail to decode facial affects. This 
explanation seems to have merit. After all, a variety of 
clinical groups have shown an impairment in the ability to 
recognize facial affect, including juvenile delinquents 
(Mccown et al., 1986), parents of schizophrenics (Mccown, 
Johnson, Austin, & Shefsky, in press), and psychotic 
children (Cutting, 1980). 
Mccown, Johnson and Austin (1986) have suggested that a 
common genetic core might be present in these diverse 
populations causing such deficits. one such cause could be 
the Eysencks' notion of a similar biological personality 
factor common in both delinquents and schizophrenic (Eysenck 
& Eysenck, 1976), namely Psychoticism (P). Since Psychotic-
ism has a high hereditability coefficient (approximately 
. 8 O; Eysenck & Eysenck, 19 8 5) it would be expected that 
parents of criminals or schizophrenics might demonstrate an 
impairment in affect recognition that corresponds with their 
genetic covariance with the population showing the affect 
recognition deficits. 
While this interesting hypothesis has yet to be tested, 
Psychoticism as the lone explanatory construct in the 
comparative inabilities of diverse clinical groups to decode 
affect is not supported by two studies. Rosenthal, Hall 
Dimatteo, Rogers, and Archer (1979) administered the Ey-
sencks' Psychoticism Scale to a group of inpatients. 
Rosenthal et al. also administered their test of nonverbal 
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sensitivity, the PONS, a multichannel measure of affect 
recognition accuracy to these same patients. The correla-
tion between the ability to decode facial affect (a subscale 
of PONS) and the Eysencks' P scale was approximately .30 in 
a mixed schizophrenic/severely neurotic inpatient group. 
Even correcting for range restriction and for reliability of 
the measure which boosts the correlation to the upper .40's, 
only 20 to 25% of the variance of schizophrenics' deficits 
in the ability to decode facial expressions of emotion is 
attributable to P. 
In a normal, nonclinical population, this correlation 
becomes more questionable. Mccown (1988) found a correla-
tion of .24 between psychoticism and the ability to decode 
facial affects in college students. This accounts for only 
6% of the total variance. However, this correlation was 
found only when subjects viewed facial expressions for 
extremely brief periods of time through a tachistoscope. 
When subjects were free to inspect slides for five seconds, 
either as projected on screen or when handed pictures, the 
correlation between P and affect recognition became insig-
nificant. 
Since the version of the Psychoticism inventory used was 
a revised form from the one Rosenthal et al~ administered, 
and since the affect recognition tasks were different, rigid 
comparisons between results are unfeasible. However, the 
difference in correlations could suggest that additional 
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processes in schizophrenics are responsible for the compara-
tive inability to decode facial expression, other than 
simply their amount of psychoticism. While the perso·nality 
variable of Psychoticism might account for some of the 
deficits in schizophrenics' inability to decode facial 
expressions, the great percentage of the variance appears 
due to other processes, for example, subsequent neuro-
psychological injury that might covary with psychoticism in 
a clinical population. The results could also suggest that 
the a negative relationship between psychotic symptoms and 
facial affect recognition is not linear but increases at a 
higher function for individuals whose Psychoticism scores 
are in the highest portions of the distribution. 
Latent Neuropsychological Deficits 
A third explanation is that schizophrenia either masks 
or is associated with more diffuse neuropsychological 
deficits, some of which might involve areas of the brain 
that process facial expressions, including, but not neces-
sarily limited to the right hemisphere. This brain damage, 
causal, concomitant with, or subsequent to the disease, is 
the reason for the relative inability of schizophrenics to 
decode facial expressions of emotion. At least one study 
has suggested that schizophrenics resemble right hemispheric 
head injured patients in their comparative inability to 
decode facial expressions (Rosenthal & Benowitz, 1986). To 
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date, no one has directly attempted to compare schizophren-
ics with and without such damage in regards to their 
ability to decode facial expressions. 
A review article by Morrison and Bellack (1987) has 
suggested that deteriorative brain damage might be respon-
sible for facial affect recognition deficits in some schizo-
phrenics. The implication is that by targeting subgroups 
likely to be organically affected more differentially 
efficacious psychosocial rehabilitation can be provided. 
These authors argue that some of the initial promise of the 
psychosocial rehabilitation movement may have been stymied 
by a lack of knowledge regarding neurological possibilities. 
Social skills training with neuropsychologically impaired 
patients-especiaJ,ly schizophrenics-is much less likely to 
achieve the magnitude of effect size that is possible with 
neuropsychologically intact patients. 
Affect Certainty, Intensity and Perceiyed Pleasantness and 
Neuropsycholoqical Deficits 
The above discussion has reflected the literature 
interest in affect recognition accuracy at the expense of 
other theoretically fruitful variables. As noted previously, 
individuals with organic conditions, especially right 
parietal dysfunction have been found to rate facial expres-
sions as less pleasant. Regarding affect certainty and 
perceived intensity of expression in neuropsychologically 
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deficit individuals, the literature is silent. Predictions 
must be made on what is known about the behavior of brain 
injured and deficit individuals. In a sense, this portion of 
the dissertation is a pilot study examining relatively newly 
conceptualized variables. 
Affect certainty as well as other judgments of certain-
ty regarding social stimuli would seem to be determined by 
at least two cortical function (Luria, 1973). One function 
would be the ability to self-monitor, highly dependent upon 
the frontal lobes (Lezak, 1983; Stuss & Benson, 1986). 
According to Luria (1973) individuals with such frontal lobe 
deficits have difficulty holding decisions in abeyance. 
They are likely to make "all or none" judgments, and have 
little tolerance for ambiguity. They appear to demonstrate 
an egotistical self assurance that they are correct. Since 
individuals with neuropsychological deficits would presumab-
ly be at risk for lacking the cortical equipment for self-
monitoring, we might expect to see more subjective feelings 
of affect certainty in individuals with neuropsychological 
deficits. 
Affect certainty is also likely to be related to right 
parietal deficits (in left hemisphere dominant individuals). 
Since Critchley's classic study (1953) it has been known 
that non dominant parietal dysfunction is accompanied by a 
randomness of response to the environment regarding visual 
and spatial identification, as well as an intense subjective 
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conviction that the response made is essentially reasonable 
and correct. These types of deficits have been discussed at 
length by Luria (1973). The most striking manifestation of 
this deficit is seen in unilateral neglect, a nondominant 
parietal dysfunction where the individual with an impairment 
in this area literally neglects and actually ignores input 
to the appropriate contralateral visual and spatial field, 
yet is absolutely certain he or she is not doing so. 
Regardless of whether affect certainty is a function of 
the frontal lobes or the nondominant parietal lobes, in-
dividuals with organic neuropsychological impairment would 
likely demonstrate changes in affect certainty. We can 
hypothesize that they might rate themselves as more sure of 
facial expression judgments than nonneuropsychologically 
deficit controls. We might also suspect a compounding of the 
problem when the subjects are schizophrenics. Therefore we 
would predict an interaction between schizophrenia and the 
neuropsychological deficits on ratings regarding of subjec-
tive affect certainty. 
Regarding affect intensity, observed effects for any 
particular constellation of neuropsychological variables 
have not been systematically investigated, thus requiring 
speculation based on clinical observation. Neuropsychologi-
cal deficits are associated with less accurate neurological 
information processing (Luria, 1973). Consequently, 
critical information would likely be lost by those with such 
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deficits which might result in a general downward drift of 
subjective affect intensity. Since all of the information in 
the stimulus is not arriving correctly at its neurological 
target, the stimulus in question is likely to be rated as 
less intense. Unlike schizophrenia, which is hypothesized 
to be associated with affect intensity ratings that show a 
wide variance, neuropsychological damage will likely be as-
sociated with decreased intensity of affect perception. 
CHAP1'ER III 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
If the coincidence hypothesis were true, then the 
accurate diagnosis of schizophrenia per se should contribute 
substantially to the comparative inability to decode facial 
expressions of emotion. Schizophrenics who tested negatively 
for neurological and neuropsychological dysfunction should 
still demonstrate significant deficits in facial affect 
recognition. 
On the other hand if the hypothesis of "latent brain 
damage" is true, then schizophrenics screened for such 
deficits should demonstrate no more impairment in facial 
affect recognition than a sample of either affective disor-
dered patients, or of medical controls. In this case we 
would argue that it is not the schizophrenia that causes 
these deficits, but accompanying neurological and/or 
neuropsychological damage. 
It is also possible that schizophrenia and neuropsych-
ological deficits combine interactively, so that affect 
recognition deficits are worse among brain damaged schizo-
phrenics. They would also be expected to be impaired, 
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though not as seriously, with both neuropsychologically 
deficit nonschizophrenics and schizophrenics without 
neuropsychological deficits. 
These rival explanations have important theoretical and 
rehabilitative implications. If affect recognition deficits 
are due to neuropsychological impairments-which can be 
presumed to be permanent in the advanced stages of schizo-
phrenia (Golden, 1981)-then it is an unreasonable therapeu-
tic goal to suggest that such patients develop increased 
interpersonal 
facial affect 
involved would 
empathy and social skills dependent upon 
recognition. Rehabilitation strategies 
focus on coding information through other 
modalities, similar to the manner in which patients with 
brain injury are treated. However, if these deficits are 
due more directly to schizophrenia and its biopsychosocial 
syndrome-and not directly to brain damage-then a different 
strategy for rehabilitation might be in place. Affect 
recognition deficits might be found to be caused by any 
number of emotional or social situations associated with 
schizophrenia, such as paranoia, anxiety, depression and 
inability to concentrate. In this case, restoration of 
affect recognition would be an appropriate goal of therapeu-
tic treatment, and might actually correlate with improvement 
from neuroleptics and gross symptom reduction. 
Any test should not repeat the mistakes of previous 
researchers by undertaking a one-dimensional analysis of 
affect recognition. 
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Affect pleasantness, affect intensity 
and subjective certainty of affect identification can be 
fruitfully studied with predictions made from the literature 
regarding schizophrenia. Predictions can also be made 
regarding neuropsychological deficits and these variables. 
Pleasantness is hypothesized to be related to both schizo-
phrenia and neuropsychological deficits, with both groups 
rating affects less pleasant. Affect certainty is hypothesi-
zed to be positively related to both schizophrenia and brain 
damage, with an interaction between the two conditions. 
Finally, affect intensity is hypothesized to be related to 
more variance in the schizophrenic group and less subjective 
intensity in the neuropsychologically deficit group. 
CHAP.rER ·IV 
HYPOTHESES 
On the basis of the previous discussion, the following 
hypotheses are advanced: 
Hypothesis One predicts that psychiatric diagnoses will 
have a significant effect on the ability to decode facial 
expression. The null hypothesis is that diagnoses will have 
no effect. 
Hypothesis Two predicts that individuals with schizo-
phrenia will be significantly impaired in their ability to 
accurately identify facial expression of emotion, compared 
with medical patients. The null hypothesis is that there 
will be no difference between these groups. 
Hypothesis Three predicts that individuals who are 
schizophrenic will be significantly impaired in their 
ability to accurately identify facial expressions of 
emotion, compared with patients who are diagnosed as having 
an affective disorder. The null hypothesis is that there 
will be no difference between these groups on this variable. 
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Hypothesis Four predicts that a main effect will be 
found on the variable of neuropsychological impairment on 
the dependent measure of the ability to accurately decode 
facial expressions. The null hypothesis is that this 
variable will have no effect. 
Hypothesis Five predicts that there will be a sig-
nificant interaction between psychiatric diagnosis and 
neuropsychological impairment on the ability to decode 
facial expressions of emotion. The null hypothesis states 
that no interaction will be found. 
Hypothesis Six predicts that patients who are schizo-
phrenic and who are neuropsychologically impaired will make 
significantly more errors in facial affect recognition than 
individuals who are schizophrenic, but who are not neurop-
sychologically impaired. The null hypothesis is that there 
will be no difference between groups on this variable. 
Hypothesis Seven predicts that psychiatric diagnosis 
will have an effect on patient ratings of certainty regar-
ding responses to facial expressions. The null hypothesis is 
that there will be no significant effect for this variable. 
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Hypothesis Eight predicts that schizophrenics will be 
more certain of their judgment of facial affect recognition 
than medical patients. The null hypothesis is that· there 
will be no difference between these groups. 
Hypothesis Nine predicts that schizophrenics will be 
more certain of their judgment of facial affect recognition 
than patients with affective disorders. The null hypothesis 
is that there will be no difference between these groups. 
Hypothesis Ten predicts a main effect of neuropsycholog-
ical deficits on the dependent measure of subjective 
certainty of facial affect recognition. The null hypothesis 
is that there will be no effect. 
Hypothesis Eleven predicts a significant interaction 
between neuropsychological impairments and schizophrenia on 
subjective certainty of facial expressions. The null 
hypothesis is that there will be no interaction. 
Hypothesis Twelve predicts that neuropsychologically 
impaired schizophrenics will be more certain of their 
perception of affects than non impaired schizophrenics. The 
null hypothesis is that there will be no difference between 
these groups. 
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Hypothesis Thirteen predicts that the status of psychia-
tric diagnosis will have an effect on the variable of 
subjective ratings of pleasantness of emotions. The null 
hypothesis is that this variable will have no effect. 
Hypothesis Fourteen predicts that schizophrenic 
patients will rate slides of facial expression as less 
pleasant than medical patients rate them. The null hypothe-
sis is that no difference will be found 
groups. 
between these 
Hypothesis Fifteen predicts that schizophrenics will 
rate slides of facial expression as less pleasant than 
patients with affective disorders. The null hypothesis is 
that there,will be no difference between these groups. 
Hypothesis Sixteen predicts that neuropsychologically 
impaired subjects will rate slides of facial expressions as 
less pleasant than non impaired subjects. The null hypothe-
sis is that there will be no difference between these 
groups. 
Hypothesis Seventeen predicts that there will be a 
significant interaction between neuropsychological impair-
ment and schizophrenia on ratings of pleasantness of facial 
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expression. The null hypothesis is that there will be no 
interaction. 
Hypothesis Eighteen predicts that neuropsychologically 
impaired schizophrenics will rate slides of facial expres-
sion as less pleasant than non impaired schizophrenics. The 
null hypothesis is that there will be no differences between 
these groups. 
Hypothesis Nineteen predicts that unequal within group 
variances will be found between the schizophrenic group and 
the pooled variance of the other groups The null hypothesis 
is that variances will be the same between these groups. 
Hypothesis Twenty predicts that neuropsychologically 
impaired patients will state less subjectively perceived 
intensity than non impaired patients. The null hypothesis 
is that there will be no differences between these two 
groups. 
As it will be seen in the next chapter, six quasi-ex-
perimental groups will be used to test different hypotheses 
regarding the role of the schizophrenia and neuropsychol-
ogical deficits on affect recognition. Since the literature 
suggests (Mandal, 1986) that affective disorders have a 
small but significant effect on affect recognition, hypothe-
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ses regarding the comparison between the three groups of 
medical patients, affective disordered patients, and schizo-
phrenics should be constructed to first find a main·effect 
for the independent variable of diagnosis, and then to test 
more specific hypotheses regarding the order of mean 
differences between groups. Consequently, Hypotheses I, VII, 
XIII and XIX predict nonspecific differences between three 
groups. Even though they represent a priori theorization, 
related hypotheses following each of these (II, VIII, XIV 
and XX, respectively) should be tested only if the overall 
omnibus ~ test for the accompanying previous hypotheses are 
significant (Hays, 1981). 
CHAPTER V 
METHOD 
Design 
The design of this study is a 2 (neuropsychologically 
impaired vs not impaired) X 3 (status of diagnosis) quasi-
experimental design. Assignment to quasi-experimental 
groups was dependent upon psychiatric diagnosis and 
categorization of patients as being neuropsychologically 
impaired. 
Subjects 
Inclusion Criteria 
The psychiatric patient subjects were consecutive admis-
sions to four psychiatric units of a large inner city 
general hospital. The medical patient subjects were admis-
sions to the same hospital. All psychiatric patient 
subjects carried the DSM-III-R diagnosis of schizophrenia or 
depressive affective disorder. This study is a quasi-
experimental design; therefore, no attempt was made to 
balance quasi-experimental cells by gender, race, or 
socioeconomic status, despite obvious interests in such 
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variables. Because of the demographic nature of "typical" 
patients-minority, female, and poor-such an attempt would 
have sacrificed external validity. 
Patients were admissions to one of four separate 20 bed 
psychiatric units. Initially, only one 20 bed unit was to be 
utilized. However, preliminary statistics suggested a high 
proportion of patient admissions to this initially selected 
unit were schizophrenic. There was some concern that despite 
the safeguards (described below) a teamwide diagnostic bias 
was being felt, similar to the manner described by Janis 
(1972). Further analysis revealed that approximately the 
same number of admissions to each unit carried the diag-
nosis of schizophrenia, thus allaying concern. As an 
additional check on diagnostic integrity, each diagnosis was 
subject to frequent review from 
one of two medical teaching 
hospital for a training site. 
senior faculty members at 
universities utilizing the 
Selection of patients from each unit was made on the 
basis of an interdisciplinary treatment team diagnostic 
decision. Treatment team members were not informed that the 
study was in the progress. This was done in an attempt to 
eliminate any potential bias that such knowledge might make 
upon diagnostic reliability. 
Each team had essentially the same diagnostic proce-
dures, with slight variations in personnel. Patient diag-
nosis on all units was made by an interdisciplinary team 
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headed by a board-certified psychiatrist, in consultation 
with a clinical psychologist. Additional personnel present 
at each staffing included one to two social workers, 
clinical psychology interns and two or three psychiatric 
residents, as well as nursing personnel from each unit. A 
unanimous diagnostic decision was necessary for inclusion of 
subjects in this experiment. The researcher was not involved 
in this classification whatsoever. 
Psychiatric subjects were asked to complete a brief 
neuropsychological testing battery at the time psychological 
testing is routinely done (usually within five days of 
admission, providing the patient is cooperative). All 
subjects had received an Electro Encephalogram (ECT) and/or 
a Computerized Tomography Scan (CT) to rule out neurological 
damage, with one of these two procedures being decided upon 
by the attending physicians. Tbese laboratory tests were 
screened blindly by a neurologist. Additionally, all 
subjects were screened with the Mini Mental State Examina-
tion (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) by either a 
psychiatrist, or a resident in neurology/psychiatry. The 
Mini Mental State Examination is a brief orally administered 
screening tool that is presently quite popular with physici-
ans, who utilize these scores as a screening device to 
determine if further neurological work ups are necessary. 
Subjects who showed no indication of EEG or CT abnor-
mality, showed no neuropsychological deficits in neuro-
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psychological testing, and had neurological impairment ruled 
out as a diagnostic consideration on the basis of physician 
examination were operationally defined as neuropsychologi-
cally normal. Patient who showed neuropsychological 
deficits on testing and who showed laboratory data 
associated with neuropsychological abnormalities (EEG or CT) 
were operationally defined as neuropsychologically def i-
cient. Subjects who met only one or two of these criteria 
were not included in this study. 
Two categories of comparison groups were utilized. One 
group was composed of patients who were diagnosed as 
unipolar affective disorder by the above diagnostic de-
cisionmaking process. These included patients diagnosed as 
DSM III-R Dysthymic Disorder, Major Depression, or Adjust-
ment Disorder with Features of Depression, but not bipolar 
manic depressive illness. 
As with the schizophrenic group, this quasi-experimental 
group was subdivided into two subgroups, those with and 
without neuropsychological impairments. The criteria 
utilized within the schizophrenic group was also that of 
the affective group, including neuropsychological testing, a 
neurological screening, and the presence or absence of 
laboratory data. 
A second comparison group was composed of medical 
patients from the same hospital. Physicians were asked if 
they would be willing to suggest eligible patients for this 
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study. Potential patients were selected at random from the 
availability lists of several medicine and surgical units. 
They were then verbally screened regarding their history of 
psychiatric hospitalizations. Prior screening was also 
routinely administered by medical students as part of a 
medical history and physical examination upon admission. 
Eligibility was limited to non immediately terminally 
ill or nonterminally ill individuals with no history of 
psychiatric disorders. Although medical patients included in 
this study had in some cases terminal disorders, none of the 
patients were in critical condition. 
As with the schizophrenic and affective disorder groups, 
two subgroups with and without neuropsychological impair-
ment were obtained. All patients received the Mini Mental 
State administered by a medical resident of the relevant 
discipline. For medical patients who were included as 
neuropsychologically impaired the fallowing criteria were 
required: Examination and positive findings by at least one 
neurologist or a resident (under a neurologist's super-
vision) of a neurological diagnosis; secondly, impairment on 
neuropsychological tests; third, laboratory data of neurolo-
gical impairment, as indicated above. 
The second subgroup of medical patients was composed of 
patients without neurological or neuropsychological impair-
ment. These patients were also screened by a resident with 
the Mini Mental State. However, hospital practice was that a 
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neurology consultation and subsequent laboratory testing was 
not invoked if the patient did not have diagnostic signs 
prompting such a referral. By definition, these signs would 
exclude patients from this non impaired group. consequent-
ly, these patients did not have had a neurological consult 
or lab work up for neurological problems. All patients, 
however, had been reviewed by internists, or other ap-
propriate specialists screening for neurological disorders. 
Additionally, patients were included in this group only if 
their medical charts were noncontributory for neurological 
impairments and neuropsychological testing did not find 
indication of neuropsychological deficits. 
Informed consent was be obtained from each patient in 
the medical and the psychiatric groups. This consent farm 
was approved by the participating Internal Review Boards for 
Human Subject Research at the location of the study. 
Subject demographic variables for the entire study were as 
follows: 37% (44) of the subjects were male, while 63% (76) 
were female. Approximately 37% (44) of subjects were 
caucasian, while 59% (71). were black and the remaining 5 
subjects were either Hispanic or Asian. Only 28% (34) of the 
subjects were presently married. The remaining subjects 
were either widowed, unmarried, never married, or divorced. 
Eighty-three percent of the subjects (100) were on some form 
of public assistance or supported by relatives. Fifteen 
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percent stated being employed or retired on pension. The 
remaining 2% did not furnish this information. 
Exclusion Criteria 
Patients were excluded from the psychiatric groups in 
this study if their was uncertainty about their Axis I 
diagnosis or if they could not give informed consent for 
legal or for personal reasons. Under state law minors (under 
18 unless married) and legally detained "court-ordered" 
patients cannot give legal consent and therefore were 
excluded. 
Subjects were routinely screened for visual impairment 
by a third year medical student (as part of the workup 
admission physical examination) to ascertain whether their 
vision was sufficient to see the test stimuli, described 
below. Vision better than 20/60 (corrected) was required. 
Only three patients were excluded from this study for this 
reason. 
Instruments 
Facial Stimuli 
As Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth (1972) have shown, it 
is difficult to obtain facial affect stimuli that are 
reliable portrayals of the affects they are attempting to 
represent. An additional problem, even with a reliable 
measure of facial affect, is the method of stimulus ad-
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ministration. Ekman et al. (1972) believe that the most 
natural procedure is to administer the stimuli via a tachis-
toscope, since their evidence suggests that most 'facial 
affects are presented for extremely brief periods of time. 
Another popular approach is to present emotional stimuli in 
the form of brief film vignettes (Rosenthal et al., 1979). 
on the other hand, many researchers opt for the more time 
efficient method of presenting slide stimuli on a projector 
for group testing. There is no published data concerning the 
superiority of one method of affect presentation compared 
with another, or whether one particular method produces 
results that are either more reliable or valid. 
In a pilot study for this dissertation, the author 
(Mccown, 1988) tested the reliability and intercorrelations 
of three different methods of presentation of facial affect 
test stimuli. These included screen projection of facial 
affect slides via a group format, individual tachistoscopic 
projection, and reproduction of slides onto 3" by 5 11 photo-
graphs that were hand inspected personally by each subject 
involved. 
Both the "slide method" and the individual presentation 
of 3" by 5 11 photographs had essentially the same mean and 
standard deviations of recognition accuracy. The correla-
tion between these two methods was reasonably good, .695 at 
a one hour interval. Tachistoscopic presentation correlated 
.581 with slide presentation, and .373 with individual 
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picture presentation. These results suggest that the slide 
and picture formats are essentially comparable and are 
tapping the same perceptual processes. 
The slide format has the advantage that it can be ad-
ministered in a group presentation. Unfortunately, the 
slide method presentation requires subjects to sit upright 
for prolonged periods of time in a fixed position at a 
specific distance form a lenticular screen. A second pilot 
study was conducted on 17 medical outpatients patients par-
ticipating in a cardiac rehabilitation program that the 
author led. Fourteen of these outpatients reported that this 
method was highly uncomfortable. It was feared that even 
greater difficulties might be encountered in more seriously 
ill inpatients. Consequently stimulus presentation to each 
subject was by the individual picture method, a more 
comfortable procedure. 
The test for facial affect recognition was selected from 
Ekman and Friesen's facial affect recognition test (1976), a 
series of 111 slides of the six primary facial expressions 
of emotion. The author's previous research suggests that 
equal numbers of slides of each emotion be utilized, with 
equal numbers of slides being portrayed by male and female 
models, as much as is possible with the distribution of 
gender in the slides. For obvious psychometric reasons, 
reliability is increased by additional test items. 
Consequently, when working with normal adults preference is 
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for a large number of slides, usually approximately 100 or 
more. 
However, such a procedure might prove too long for 
medical patients and more severely ill schizophrenics and 
brain damaged subjects. Prior to collection of data it was 
important to pretest the ability of a random sample of 
schizophrenics and medical patients from the population 
included in this study to ascertain if the procedure would 
prove too exhaustive for accurate stimulus response. 
In a third pilot study 14 schizophrenics and 11 medical 
controls were shown 98 slides of facial expression. Subjects 
were asked to circle an emotion that corresponded to the 
affects seen in the test stimuli. Several problems were 
evident. Two schizophrenics and two medical patients had 
difficulty consistently reading the stimulus words. In-
dividual words were read with no difficulty. However, there 
was evidence of insertion and omission of key words when the 
pretest form was presented in tote. It was uncertain whether 
this represented a difficulty with literacy tasks due to 
" age, lack of formal education, or primary dyslexia. 
However, it was clear that while the individual words (i.e. 
happy, sad, fear, surprise, anger and disgust) could be read 
once or twice, they became confusing on an answer sheet. 
The second problem was found, surprisingly, with the 
medical patients, but not with the schizophrenics. Two 
subjects appeared to be answering essentially randomly after 
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about the halfway point of testing. Subsequent interviews 
with these patients indicated that the procedure was too 
tiring in its length. 
In fact, on subsequent interviews four more medical 
patients stated that the procedure was too long to complete 
comfortably. Since Feinberg, Rifkin, Schaffer, and Walker 
( 1986) report adequate variance for a similar task with 
schizophrenics utilizing only 22 slides from the Ekman and 
Friesen series it was determined that a reduction in facial 
stimuli was an adequate trade-off to prevent subject 
fatigue. Pilot study four found 42 presentations (three each 
for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, fear, and disgust, 
as well as for neutral affects, each being displayed by 
both genders) to be a sufficiently short task that en-
countered no complaints, even for two patients that were 
acutely ill with exhaustive HIV complex disorders. 
Neutral slides were not included in this study, because 
of issues regarding their reliability. No norms are avail-
able regarding what percent of the population correctly 
decodes neutral slides as neutral. Consequently, the number 
of affects presented was reduced to 36. 
Another difficulty was anticipated by Feinberg et al. If 
schizophrenia is related to left hemispheric dysfunctioning, 
it would be expected that schizophrenics might demonstrate 
difficulty in emotional labeling that is independent of 
their actual capacity to recognize emotions. They might 
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recognize emotional similarity but fail to come up with the 
adequate words necessary. Feinberg et al. found that 
schizophrenics often knew which emotions were similar, but 
could not attach verbal labels to the stimuli in a free, 
unstructured recall test where such words needed to be 
spontaneously produced without prompts. Their solution was a 
task of matching, in which schizophrenics were shown affects 
of different people two-at-a-time, and asked if the faces 
displayed similar emotions. 
This type of matching procedure has an advantage in that 
it eliminates the need for subjects to be able to read the 
very basic words involved in this test. While pilot data 
(N=4) by this author demonstrates that the matching method 
of the above authors was workable, this procedure was 
rejected for two reasons. First, chance approximations (.5) 
reduce the variance involved with such a method, making it 
much less sensitive a measure of deficits. 
Of more concern is the dual processing nature of such a 
matching task. The patient must make two apparently diverse 
judgments. One relates to emotional categorization, while 
the other regards canceling interference based on an absence 
of facial identities, a frontal lobe function that schizoph-
renics are at risk to perform poorly (Golden, 1981). In a 
nonverbal matching test subjects do not have to respond to 
words. However, they do have to make a second and more 
complex response involving ignoring the interference genera-
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ted by the fact that the stimulus affects and the categor-
ization affects are of different people. This involves a set 
shifting process that might further impair schizophrenics. 
The author's test of four schizophrenics with a matching 
paradigm found that one subject was so impaired .that he 
could not comprehend that he was to ignore that the two 
faces he was to match were of different people. He was, 
however, able to circle appropriate words corresponding to 
emotions he perceived a series of affects to be displaying. 
This finding is entirely predictable from neuropsychological 
theory. Golden states (1978) that verbal information 
processing of words is the least likely skill to be dis-
rupted by either schizophrenia or brain damage. The rather 
extensive literature on the Stroop Color Word Naming Test 
supports this (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966). Simple printed words 
are overlearned and responded to very quickly, even by 
severely cognitively impaired individuals. Schizophrenics 
and brain damaged subjects seem to have no difficulty 
understanding the words "happy, sad, anger, fear, surprise, 
and disgust" as long as they were presented in a 1 imi ted 
fashion. 
In the author's pilot study a subject who had less than 
a third grade education was able to perf arm the reading 
requirement and the task at hand, despite the presence of a 
global inability to respond to sentences with more than 
three words. However, there seemed to be some subject 
65 
confusion when an entire ~ of words-even repetitive ones-
was presented at once. Because of this it was decided to 
administer the affect recognition test 
cumbersome procedure, certainly, though 
guarantees proper subject response. 
orally, 
one that 
more 
better 
Four inch by six inch cards with the emotional labels 
were prepared with two inch Roman stencil. These were placed 
on a flat surface, approximately three feet from the sub-
jects' faces if they were medically able to sit. For 
bedridden subjects, similar cards were attached to a small 
poster board held up approximately two to three feet from 
the subjects' heads by a portable chart stand. Exact 
measures were occasionally compromised by medical equipment 
and demanded flexibility. As a safeguard patients who could 
not read these words from the distance of two feet-either 
due to total ~lliteracy, or to additional eye problems not 
screened out in the preliminary medical student examination 
were immediately eliminated from the study. Nine subjects 
were eliminated from the testing procedure on the basis of 
the reading criteria described above. 
Aphasia Screening 
Despite the ability of schizophrenics to read simple 
prompt words, one caveat must be applied that seemed to have 
eluded previous researchers. Individuals who manifest one of 
the many aphasias might not be able to perform the required 
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task. Aphasias-or difficulty in processing language-can 
interfere with the ability to understand verbal directions, 
or the ability to respond correctly to written directions. 
Indeed, in a sixth pretest one individual with aphasia could 
read the stimulus words adequately, but was not able to 
comprehend the instructions. Another could read the stimulus 
.words adequately, yet was not able to respond consistently 
when stimuli were immediately repeated. A third neurologi-
cal patient demonstrated echoic perseverance, and answered 
each question exactly the same. 
To guard for these aphasia related problems encountered 
during the pretest the author utilized the verbal portions 
of the Halstead Aphasia screening test (Reitan, 1957) a 
brief and very accurate examination to rule out aphasias 
that might interfere with testing procedures and results. 
Subjects were excluded from the study if aphasia scores were 
beyond the cut off suggested by Reitan, and those published 
in the norms of Russell, Neuringer, and Goldstein (1970). 
Six subjects were excluded on this basis. 
Neuropsycholoqical Testing 
This study utilizes neuropsychological testing as one of 
the procedures to rule out or diagnose brain impairment. 
Three method are typically used in such psychological 
screening when it occurs in either a research or clinical 
setting. The first method involves the utilization of a 
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single test that literature has indicated is highly sensi-
tive to neuropsychological deficiencies. According to Golden 
(1981) and Lezak (1983) such tests include the Digit Span 
and Digit Symbols, from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
scale. They also include the Stroop Color Word Naming Test, 
the Benton Visual Retention Test, the Trailmaking Test, 
Finger Tapping and Strength Dynonometer Tests, and the 
Wisconisn Card Sort. A review of the literature indicates 
that the majority of neuropsychological studies published to 
date utilize only one test as a measure of organicity. 
A second and probably more accurate method for assessing 
organic impairment and subsequent neuropsychological damage 
is the utilization of a comprehensive neuropsychological 
battery. Two batteries are commonly employed in typical 
tasks, the Halstead-Reitan, and the Luria-Nebraska (Golden, 
1981). The Halstead has a number of strong adherents (Reitan 
& Davison, 1974), and seems to be the test of "tradition". 
The Luria-Nebraska is a rather new test, constructed in the 
late 1970s. Based on the theory of brain functioning by A. 
s. Luria ( 1963; 1973) , the Luria-Nebraska is a clinician-
administered examination that takes about one-and-one half 
to three hours to complete (Golden, 1981). 
For general neuropsychological screening, there is no 
reason to prefer one of these two tests over the other, 
except for the factor of convenience that the briefer Luria 
battery affords (Golden, 1981; Golden, 1987). Both the 
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briefer Luria and the lengthier Halstead-Reitan seem to 
possess accurate "hit rates" for diagnosing brain localiza-
tion dysfunction (Golden, Hammeke, Purisch, Berg, Moses, 
Newlin, Wilkening & Puente, 1982). On the other hand, 
comprehensive neuropsychological batteries are probably 
inappropriate for most research questions. The typical 
neuropsychological battery assesses scores of functions and 
rules out an equal number of other diagnoses. It is frankly 
too lengthy for most research that does not require such 
information (Golden, 1987) • While comprehensive batteries 
may have a slightly higher hit rate than individual tests, 
they exhaust the subject receiving them. 
In this study there was little need for the additional 
information such batteries pr9vide. Irrelevant data typical-
ly derived from total batteries would include overall I. 
Q. , short and long term memory functioning for multiple 
sensory stimuli, rhythm and tone perception, agraphia, 
acalculia, dyslexia, numerous anemias, and the many dysprax-
ias that are routinely and laboriously assessed in a full 
battery.4 
4 Yet another approach presently popular in the litera-
ture is the utilization of a brief version of standardized 
test, such as Golden's (1981) Pathognomic scale, a subtest 
of the Luria Nebraska Inventory. In this case, the Pathog-
nomic scale is composed of items thought to be easy for a 
non brain damaged individual to "pass" and very difficult 
for a brain impaired person to accomplish. Clinical ex-
perience has suggested that brief tests such as the Pathog-
nomic scale have accentuated "hit rates"in lower socioecono-
mic populations such as the one used in this study. 
Literature, however, is lacking on this point. 
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To· avoid the inconvenience to the patient of a lengthy 
battery, yet increasing the "hit rate" associated with the 
single test method, Golden (1981) suggests the common 
clinical practice of utilizing multiple sensitive single 
indicators in what is known as a "screening battery". This 
procedure involves the utilization of three or four highly 
sensitive tests for brain impairment used together. Tests 
can be chosen to differentially tap impairments in diffuse 
areas. In this manner, two tests that have a hit rate of 
80% each and that are differentially sensitive to different 
areas of deficits can be combined to produce a hit rate 
much higher than each test individually, or two or more 
tests that are equally strong in assessing similar def icien-
cies. 
Golden (1981) recommends screening batteries include 
assessment of frontal lobe functioning, lateralization 
deficits, and measures highly sensitive to overall impair-
ment. Since affect recognition is thought to lateralize to 
the nondominant parietal hemisphere, adequate assessment of 
this areas is essential. Care must be taken to utilize tests 
that do not routinely confuse schizophrenia with organicity, 
a difficult task at best. 
Routine Wechsler Intelligence Scales contain some of the 
best diagnostic information regarding brain damage (Golden, 
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1981). An essential test of overall neuropsychological 
functioning is the Digit Span test of the WAIS, or WAIS-R 
(Lezak, 1983). Dewolfe et al. ( 1971) found that a com-
parison between the Comprehension Subtest and the Digit Span 
produced a sensitive indicator of impairment. In the case of 
brain damaged subjects, Comprehension was higher than Digit 
Span. 
Golden {1981) has suggested that this indicator might 
be dependent upon population-specific parameters. While 
Dewolfe et al. suggest a scale score of one point difference 
between the Comprehension and Digit Span might be sufficient 
to suggest a diagnosis of brain damage, normative data on 
fifteen inner city medical patients similar to those being 
tested in this study (collected by the author in routine 
clinical work, as compared to a formal pilot testing 
attempt) found scaled score differences of three points 
with one normal subject, and three incidences of scale 
scores with Comprehension two points higher than Digit Span. 
Because of this, the criteria of a C/DS difference of four 
points is utilized as a cut off. The arbitrariness of this 
cut-off point is tempered somewhat by the clinical ex-
perience of the researcher and his immediate supervisors in 
dealing with populations of the type sampled in this study. 
Golden (1981) suggests a very powerful indicator of 
nondominant hemispheric impairment is the WAIS-R Block 
Design Subtest. This test has good discriminative abilities 
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in schizophrenics and neurological patients. Another test 
with similar discriminative ability in schizophrenics as 
well as nonschizophrenics is the Digit Symbol Subtest.WAIS-
R. While the Digit Symbol Subtest is highly sensitive to 
brain damage, it is also sensitive to anxiety and distrac-
tion An alternative test has been suggested by Smith (1982), 
the Michigan Symbol Digit Modalities Test, essentially a 
more investigator controlled version of Digit Symbols. 
This test is administered orally, controlling somewhat for 
distraction and anxiousness, and more so for tremors that 
are frequently a side effect of medication or age. This 
test is highly effective in determining organicity in both 
schizophrenics and in general patients . 
. Unfortunately, some of the most sensitive tests for 
brain damage are performed extremely poorly by schizophreni-
cs. These include the Wisconsin Card Sort and the Halstead 
Categories Test. However, Golden's modification of the 
Stroop Color Word Naming Test ( 1978) is a standard and 
effective tool that is able to differentiate the presence 
of organicity with or without the presence of schizophrenia 
and still serve as a rather sensitive test of frontal lobe 
functioning. It was also hoped to utilize the Trailmaking 
Test from the Halstead battery. However, the author's 
clinical experience has suggested that these scores are 
significantly depressed by involuntary and intentional 
tremors that frequently affect individuals who have been on 
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high doses of phenothiazenes for prolonged periods. Since 
many patients included in this study fit this category, 
trailmaking was not included. Unfortunately, there · is no 
literature regarding adjusting such scores for patients 
with such disorders as Tardive Dyskinesia and Parkinsonian-
ism. 
Right hemispheric differences (often used generically in 
the literature to indicate the nondominant hemisphere) are 
extremely important to note in this study. To do so, two 
effective and simple tasks can be employed. The Halstead 
Finger Tapping Test (Lezak, 1983) simply has subjects tap a 
telegraph key as fast as they can for 10 seconds. Average 
scores over five trials are computed with each hand and 
norms are then utilized to suggest presence or absence of 
hemispheric dysfunction. A similar second test is the 
Strength Dynometer, a hand-held squeezing device that can be 
similarly utilized. Since both tests are approximate 
measures of the same functioning, either is appropriate, 
although the finger tapping test would appear to confound 
perseverance and attention with simple lateralization 
measures as it requires ten total trials overall, five for 
each hand. Both tests were utilized in this study. 
Right parietal functioning is popularly examined 
directly by visual-spatial performance in the Aphasia 
Screening Test (Taylor, 1981) • Particularly, failure to 
adequately construct such figures as the Greek Cross- a 
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subtest of the Halstead Reitan Aphasia Screening Exam-is 
highly pathognomic of right parietal deficits and could 
possibly correlate with the inability to decode facial and 
other nonverbal perception. Similarly, the WAIS-R Subtest 
of Picture Arrangements is also diagnostic of right hemis-
pheric, and particularly, right parietal functioning. Since 
neuroleptics and physical and psychiatric symptoms can 
impair the quality of the "Greek Cross" test in seriously 
ill patients (due to either motor strength problems or 
voluntary muscular tremors) the Picture Arrangement Subtest 
of the WAIS-R, which does not require particularly fine 
motor movement, was utilized rather than the drawings from 
the Halstead Reitan Aphasia Screening Test. 
On the basis of the above, the screening battery 
employed in this study consisted consist of the following: 
1. Verbal i terns from ·the Aphasia Screening Test, 2. A 
combination of Digit Span and Comprehension Subtest from the 
WAIS-R, 3. The Symbol Digits Test, 4. The Stroop Color Word 
Test, 5. The Block Design Subtest from the WAIS-R, 6. 
Strength Dynometer Test and Fingertapping Tests, 7. The 
Picture Arrangement Subtest Test fFom the WAIS-R. 
Examiner recording sheets for neuropsychological 
variables were constructed, recorded and scored. cut-off 
scores for evidence of organici ty were obtained for age 
normative data germane to each test, summarized in the test 
manual, (the Stroop, the Symbol Digits Test, and the Aphasia 
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screening Test) or in Lezak (1983), and in Russell, Neuring-
er, and Goldstein ( 1970) for the WAIS-R and performance 
measures. Digit Span/Comprehension comparisons were made on 
the basis of pretest data as described previously. 
Individuals who showed deficiencies in any of the tests 
were classified as neuropsychologically impaired. Subjects 
whose Aphasia Screening Test was beyond the cut-off were 
immediately discontinued from the study as it was possible 
that they might not be able to follow or execute directions 
adequately, thus confounding any experimental effects. 
The thoroughness of these tests compared with routinely 
utilized batteries for detecting organicity is noted from 
clinical testing material collected by the author, while 
obtaining direct supervision from a neuropsychologist. 
Eleven complete Luria-Nebraska inventories were also 
supplemented with the above battery of nine tests,· in a 
manner suggested by Golden (1981) who argues that the Luria-
Nebraska should be preceded by a screening battery composed 
of many of the above tests. In 10 out of 11 cases the 
results of the Luria were in agreement with those of the 
screening battery, as defined by one cut-off score in the 
battery diagnosing brain damage and one critical level in 
the Luria reaching the same conclusion. In one case the 
Luria was more lenient, possibly due to the adjustable 
critical level cut off scores that are generously reduced 
for lack of education of patients. In this case, four Luria 
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scale scores approached the critical level, and one brief 
battery cut off score was superceded. 
More impressive was a second set of data collected on 
middle class psychiatric inpatients with possible organicity 
who had been given not only a CT scan but also a Metal 
Resonating Image (MRI) test, a very sophisticated radiolo-
gical procedure that allows precise color pictures to be 
made of brain functioning. Eight patients with senile, 
presenile, traumatic, or HIV related dementias were ad-
ministered the above battery as part of clinical duties. 
Administration was prior to scheduling of the MRI. Global 
impairment was accurately identified all eight times. 
Furthermore four patients with functional disorders, and 
two non demented HIV positive patients were correctly 
identified prior to MRI testing as having no impairments. 
Only in one case was a diagnosis made on the basis of 
neuropsychological evidence that was not confirmed by the 
MRI. In this case the patient was very limited in capacity 
to speak English. The accuracy of the screening battery 
utilized in this study should therefore be clear. 
Procedures 
Psychiatric patients selected for testing were done so 
by the researcher asking nursing personnel whether newly 
admitted and "staffed" patients had diagnoses of either 
schizophrenia or affective disorders. (Over 80% of the 
76 
patients fell into these diagnostic groups). The researcher 
further specified that he did not want to known which of the 
two diagnostic categories the patient being solicited was 
classified under, but wanted to include the patient "only if 
they are one of the two, but please don't tell me which". In 
this manner the researcher attempted to remain "blind" 
regarding the patient's diagnosis. Following testing, the 
researcher would validate the diagnosis from the patients' 
chart. 
Subjects were tested individually. Rapport consistent 
with instructions in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
revised (Wechsler, 1977) and the Rorschach Test (Exner, 
1978) was maintained. That is, subjects were offered vague 
encouragements and reinforcement deliberately noncontingent 
upon response pattern, but instead contingent upon response 
effort. Only two subjects refused to participate because the 
task was "too difficult", having decided to terminate 
participation after the data collection began. 
Each subject signed an informed consent agreement. 
Subjects were then told the purpose of the experiment: 
"This project is examining the relationship between various 
abilities and people's perception of emotions". 
Following this, subject were given the facial affect 
recognition test. Responses were solicited orally and then 
recorded by the researcher on an answer sheet. The proce-
dure was as follows: 3" by 5" photographs from the Ekman 
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series were randomized and recorded on an answer sheet prior 
to each presentation. Subjects were presented with the first 
picture, and given the following instructions: 
Now, we're going to ask you to identify the par-
ticular emotion you see here. The emotion can be any 
one of six different emotions. (At that time the 
researcher pointed to six filecards with the names of 
the emotions tested). What I want you to do is to tell 
me which of these you think it is you are seeing. 
The researcher then handed the subject the facial 
stimuli and allowed visual inspection for five seconds. 
For the second trial the researcher reminded each of the 
subjects: 
Now, remember, you can answer any of these: happy 
sad, anger fear, surprise, or disgust. You said (here the 
person's response would be repeated and recorded). 
At this point, the subject was free to change his or her 
mind. For the next nine trials the researcher would read 
each of the affect choices out loud. 
after 
This was not done 
the tenth trial unless the subject requested it or seemed 
confused. 
Subjects were allowed to change their decisions until 
the next stimulus was presented. If the subject wanted to 
change a previous opinion he or she was told, "Why don't we 
just go on to the next one. You are doing real well". 
Following selection by the subject of an emotional label 
for the affect presented the researcher stated: 
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Now on a scale of one to seven, with one being very 
little and seven being the most, how I am going to ask 
you how sure are you of this choice you just made. 
At this point, the researcher laid out a five inch pictorial 
diagram of equally appearing intervals. The following 
instructions were read: 
marked "not sure at all". 2 is 
3 is marked " a little sure". 
sure". 5 is marked "pretty 
"very sure". 7 is marked 
As you can see "l" is 
marked "not too sure" 
4 is marked "somewhat 
sure". 6 is marked 
"extremely sure". Your 
best describes how sure 
job is to pick the number that 
you are of your choice 
of emotions. 
The researcher then repeated this explanation for the 
question of "how intense do you think this person is 
displaying this emotion" with the above procedure and scale. 
Instructions were as follows: 
Now, I'm going to ask you how intense, or forceful 
the emotion you just saw was. We'll use the same seven point 
scale again. (At this point a second five inch scale was 
shown) This time 1 is marked "not intense at all". 2 is 
marked "not too intense". 3 is marked "a little intense". 4 
is marked "somewhat intense". 5 is marked " pretty in-
tense"·· 6 is marked "very sure", and 7 is marked "extremely 
intense". Your job is to pick the number that best de-
scribes how intense each emotion you see is being dis-
played. 
The final task for subjects required them to rate 
affects for perceived pleasantness. Subjects were presented 
with a seven point equal appearing interval scale as above 
for degree of pleasantness with instructions duplicating the 
above. The researcher simply repeated the above instruc-
tions, substituting the words appropriate for instructions 
regarding ratings of pleasantness. 
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Instructions were reiterated for trials two through 10 
unless the patient appeared to understand the instructions 
without prompting. They were also repeated each time the 
researcher believed that the subject had lost site of the 
task at hand. Subjects were then administered the neuro-
psychological battery, according to standardized instruc-
tions. 
An approximate time for subjects to complete the affect 
recognition and rating test was 10 to forty minutes. Most 
subjects "caught on" to the task rather quickly and became 
adept at rating and categorizing each face without sig-
nificant prompting of categories or rating scales. This 
usually occurred before the first 10 slides. Naturally, 
schizophrenics and more severely brain impaired subjects 
demonstrated more inability and were slower, although the 
variance within subjects seemed sufficient to blind the 
researcher to between group categorizations.5 
In 11 additional cases (other than the two above) it was 
necessary to stop the testing. In two cases this was due to 
medical problems procedures that needed attending during the 
session. Three patients completed the testing but showed 
significant evidence of aphasia. Two psychiatric patients 
withdrew after the beginning of the study for no apparent 
reason, specifically denying the difficulty of the test was 
5 It is notable that the group that seemed the fastest 
on this task (in retrospect, and without formal timing) were 
the depressed psychiatric patients. 
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a contributing factor. Four patients had families that 
interrupted the testing. 
Wherever possible an attempt was made to complete the 
testing during one session. When rapport was threatened, 
however, or patients appeared to be significantly exhausted 
or otherwise unwilling, the procedure was postponed to two, 
or, in four cases, three sessions. Two additional cases were 
started and then terminated due to interruption, and subse-
quent patient discharge. 
Since rapport was probably a critical factor in this 
experiment, every attempt was made to ensure its adequacy. 
Often, the researcher was known to the patients, especially 
the psychiatric patients, from his general clinical duties 
within the hospital. This seeme.d to facilitate patient 
cooperation for the long, occasionally arduous, testing 
sessions that were necessary. Care was also taken to explain 
the nature of the study to the families of patients 
involved, and to obtain their cooperation and consent. 
As there is some literature that suggests that the act 
of signing consent forms may, in some cases, influence the 
experimental outcome, copies of consent forms were presented 
to families only after the data was collected. 
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Safeguards for Confidentiality and Researcher Expectancy 
In experiments where a sole data collector performs as 
both assessor of quasi-experimental groups and collector of 
dependent measures the possibility for unconscious inves-
tigator bias is worthy of attention. Rosenthal (1976; 1981) 
has highlighted the problems of unconscious investigator 
expectancy and has suggested steps that can be taken to 
minimize the problem. 
To some extent this bias was minimized by standardized 
procedures and the utilization of objective and easy to 
score set of measures. Diagnostic consensus involved a team 
approach, and once committed to the medical chart, was 
objective. Furthermore, the researcher was not present at 
staffings, and took a deliberately "low profile" regarding 
staff contact during the period of data collection to 
minimize inadvertent exchange of information regarding 
patient status. 
Additional safeguards were also employed. These involved 
performing the assessment that delineated quasi-experimental 
groups after the collection of data involving the dependent 
variable. Facial affect data was collected prior to neurop-
sychological testing, thus minimizing the possibility of 
subtle gestures or other factors biasing subjects in a 
particular direction. 
Unfortunately, the "agnosia" of neurological functioning 
and diagnosis in psychiatric patients was occasionally 
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compromised by comments of medical staff. Furthermore, due 
to their delusional verbal content or paucity of patient 
verbalizations it was often very obvious which patients were 
in the schizophrenic group and which patients were de-
pressed. For example, one patient introduced himself as 
"Rainbow Doughnut". 
The expectancy bias problem with the affective disorder 
and medical patient controls was a less salient issue. It is 
hypothesized that this group would do well on the affect 
recognition test. Expectancy bias usually operates to lower 
ability performance {Rosenthal, 1963), rather than raise it, 
at least for short durations. This is especially true where 
ability results in a natural ceiling effect for each 
subject. 
To protect confidentiality of patients, however, 
computer safeguards involving generation of coded files were 
employed. Data was scored and entered into the computer, 
usually within a matter of hours. All identifying informa-
tion was then destroyed to protect patient confidentiality. 
This was an especially necessary provision since some of the 
patients were suffering from HIV related diagnoses. The 
relational data base kept a count of how many subjects had 
been tested in each quasi-experimental category. Finally, 
when CT or EEG information was available, these values were 
placed into the computer file. 
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The data base would then, if necessary, revise the 
numbers of patients appropriately fitting each of the 
categories, dependent upon the new information reg·arding 
neurological status. Testing for new subjects was discon-
tinued when the data base indicated a sufficient number of 
patients meeting each group was obtained. Because of this 
procedure five additional patients were tested that were not 
needed. 
Criteria Checks of Between Group Differences 
While neuropsychological diagnosis was determined objec-
tively, DSM-III-R diagnosis, or absence of a DSM-III-R 
syndrome was dependent upon diagnostic assessment rather 
than a test instrument. Physician diagnosis is frequently 
unreliable and invalid (Taylor, 1981). Consequently, 
measures were administered to different groups to make sure 
that group differences did indeed exist between the quasi 
experimental cells. These measures were not designed to 
corroborate individual diagnoses, but to ensure that 
sufficient diagnostic accuracy was existing between groups. 
Schizophrenia was assessed by the psychoticism scale 
of the Eysenck Personality Inventory, Revised (Eysenck, 
Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985), and by 15 items from the Whitaker 
Index of Schizophrenic Thinking (Whitaker, 1980) an 
instrument that purports excellent ability to discriminate 
schizophrenics from other types of patients. Items chosen 
from the Whitaker were those used by he researcher and his 
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supervisors on a routine basis and found to have excellent 
discriminative validity. The Beck Depression Inventory was 
also administered. to ascertain group differences in 
depression. 
Tests were administered following other collection of 
other data. Usually this was done during the same time as 
the previous data collection, however, in some cases as much 
as three days elapsed following the primary testing session. 
In most instances, the validity measures were administered 
orally, with the assistance of a medical student, or, in 
several cases, nursing personnel. Oral administration was 
again necessary due to the fact that little was known about 
subjects' reading abilities, a serious concern with this 
lower socioeconomic, and frequently uneducated population. 
This procedure usually took 20-30 additional minutes. 
CHAPl'ER VI 
RESULTS 
Table one shows the mean values Psychoticism, the Beck 
Depression Inventory, and the Whitaker Index of Schizophre-
nic thinking for each of the quasi-experimental groups. 
These mean values suggest that the quasi-experimental groups 
did indeed differ according to the indices of depression 
and schizophrenia. 
Hypothesis One predicted that a main effect of diagnosis 
would be found on the dependent variable of facial affect 
recognition. A 2 (status of neuropsychological impairment) X 
3 (psychiatric diagnosis) analysis of variance was per-
formed. This hypothesis was supported, ~ (2, 114) = 5.818, 
12 < • 004. 6 What this means is that .§.QID.g .statistically 
significant difference exist between the three groups of 
medical patients, affective disordered patients and schiz-
ophrenics. This test is a necessary, but not sufficient step 
for indicating that schizophrenics differ from affective 
6 The most exact probability for levels of statistical 
significance will be utilized throughout this work, rather 
than the traditional rounding of probability values to 
increments of .os, .01, .oos, etc. This is done to facili-
tate meta-analysis by future researchers, where more exact 
probability levels are desired. · 
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Group 
Table One 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Diagnostic 
and Demographic Data 
Beck 
(SD) 
EPQP 
(SD) 
Variable Values 
Net-
work 
Size 
(SD) 
Age 
(SD) 
Whit-
aker 
(SD) 
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------------------------------------------------------------Medical 15.30 2.95 5.50 45.45 2.65 
Non Impaired 6.85 1.39 2.61 20.72 1.69 
Medical 17.60 2.55 3.35 53.45 3.60 
Impaired 10.07 2.03 1.82 12.67 1.69 
Affective 29.50 2.60 5.25 46.85 3.75 
Non Impaired 7.94 1.69 2.12 16.27 1.69 
Affective 39.64 2.80 3.66 47.10 3.42 
Impaired 21.27 2.35 1.37 15.14 1.60 
Schizophrenic 16.60 5.75 6.20. 38.50 5.15 
Non Impaired 9.61 2.31 1.88 14.87 2.62 
Schizophrenic 20.00 6.10 2.40 42.90 5.05 
Impaired 10.61 2.73 1.42 15.08 2.37 
Beck=Beck Depression Inventory 
EPQP=Psychoticism Scale, Eysenck Personality Inventory 
Network Size=Number of People Living with Patient at Home 
Whitaker=Whitaker Index of Schizophrenic Thinking 
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disordered patients or from medical patients on the variable 
of affect recognition accuracy (Winer, 1971). Table Two 
shows the means and standard deviations for correct facial 
affect recognitions for each specific emotion for each 
quasi-experimental groups. 
Hypothesis Two predicted that schizophrenics would make 
significantly more errors in facial affect recognition than 
medical patients. Hypothesis Three predicted that schizo-
phrenics would make significantly more errors than patients 
with affective disorders. For the medical patient group the 
mean number of total correct responses was 31.52, with a 
standard deviation of 3.29. For the affective disorder group 
the mean number of correct responses was slightly less, 
31.05, with a standard deviation of 5.05. For the schizo-
phrenic group the number of correct responses was 28. 67, 
with a standard deviation· of 4.37. These averages "trans-
late" into an average number of correct responses per 
emotion of 5.25, 5.15, and 4.77 respectively. These latter 
means, simply division by the number of categories of 
affects presented, are more intuitively understandable and 
will be utilized for additional hypotheses. 
88 
Table Two 
Accuracy of Facial Affect Recognition by 
Quasi-Experimental Subgroups 
------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion Mean and Standard Deviation 
Group Happy Sad Anger Fear Sur- Dis-
prise gust 
------------------------------------------------------------Medical 5.45 5.60 5.40 5.35 5.25 5.05 
Non Impaired .68 .50 .68 1.13 .71 1.10 
Medical 5.75 5.55 4.95 5.15 4.95 4.60 
Impaired .44 .89 1.23 1.08 1.23 1.50 
Affective 5.80 5.55 5.70 5.25 5.45 4.95 
Non Impaired .41 .75 .47 1.11 .99 .88 
Affective 5.65 5.25 5.40 4.50 4.45 4.15 
Impaired .49 1.01 .82 1.57 1.39 1. 38 
Schizophrenic 5.20 5.00 4.60 4.80 4.95 4.25 
Non Impaired 1.11 1.29 1.35 1.19 1.19 1.06 
Schizophrenic 5.10 5.05 4.75 4.40 5.00 4.25 
Impaired 1.11 1.31 1.06 1.42 1.21 1.20 
------------
Mean Total 5.49 5.33 5.13 4.90 5.08 4.54 
.79 1.01 1.04 1.26 1.16 1.23 
Mean Medical 5.60 5.57 5.17 5.25 5.10 4.82 
.59 .71 1.01 1.10 1.08 1.29 
Mean Affective 5.75 5.40 5.50 4.87 4.95 4.55 
.45 .90 .69 1.39 1.30 1. 21 
Mean Schizo- 5.15 5.33 4.65 4.60 4.97 4.25 
phrenic 1.09 1.01 1.27 1.32 1.18 1.12 
Mean Non 5.48 5.38 5.23 5.13 5.21 4.70 
Impaired .73 .94 1.01 1.15 .99 1. 05 
Mean 5.50 5.28 5.03 4.68 4.80 4.33 
Impaired .71 1.09 1.07 1.39 1.28 1. 36 
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Prior to additional statistical tests, a brief discus-
sion regarding multiple hypothesis testing is necessary. The 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it should 
not be rejected increases as a function of the number of 
statistical procedures performed (Hays, 1981). One popular 
way of controlling for this when it is necessary to test 
numerous g priori hypotheses is to repartition the between-
group variances with orthogonal contrasts. However, this 
weighted polynomial approach is much more sensitive to 
departures from normal variance than its immediate predeces-
sor, the overall analysis of variance (Winer, 1971). 
Consequently, orthogonal contrasts are inappropriate if 
nothing is known in advance about a population distribution. 
Since little is known about the theoretical distributions 
underlying the dependent measures in this study a conserva-
tive approach suggests the imposition of the requirement of 
non-orthogonal contrasts. While these latter types of 
contrasts are more frequently utilized for post hoc proce-
dures, they are an appropriate and conservative measure for 
g priori hypotheses testing (Kirk, 1982). 
For procedures where an a priori hypothesis is tested 
with a less powerful range statistic, the moderately 
"protective" Duncan test (Kirk, 1982) is utilized in this 
study. The Duncan procedure affords more power than more 
conservative post hoc procedures. It simultaneously affords 
less protection against Type I error. Since, however, it is 
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being used on g priori hypotheses that would have "allowed" 
multiple analyses of variance it is a legitimate means of 
protection and an excellent compromise between Type· I and 
Type II errors. 
In addition, the Duncan procedure is very robust, 
tolerating violations of the normal distribution (Kirk, 
1982). If set to the individual mean comparison significance 
level of .01, the combined probabilities of rejecting the 
null hypothesis when it should not be rejected are less than 
.05 for up to six different means compared with each other. 7 
The Duncan multiple range test conducted on mean dif-
ferences in affect recognition per emotion (ranges = 3. 70 
and 3.86; pairwise comparison, R < .01) indicates that the 
schizophrenic group differs from the medical group. The 
medical group does not differ significantly from the af f ec-
ti ve group, nor does the affective group differ significant-
ly from the schizophrenic group. For the schizophrenic 
group the average number correct affects is 4.77 for each 
emotional category, with a standard deviation of .842. For 
patients with affective disorders, the mean number of 
correct affect recognitions ~er category is 5.18, with a 
standard deviation of .690. For the medical patients the 
7 The exact probability is 1-(1-alpha) r-1 (Duncan, 
1955). For six mean comparisons conducted simultaneously 
(one for each of the affects tested or one for each of the 
quasi-experimental groups) and each pairwise comparison set 
at the • 01 level, the probability of a Type one error is 
.0490095. For three comparisons (diagnostic groups) this 
overall Type I error is .029701. 
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average number of affect recognitions for each emotion is 
5. 25 with a standard deviation of . 549. Consequently, 
Hypothesis Two is supported, while Hypothesis Three is not 
supported. 
Hypothesis Four predicted that patients with neuropsy-
chological impairments would make less correct affect 
recognitions than non impaired patients. For the neuro-
psychologically impaired groups the mean number of correct 
affects identified for each emotion was 4. 94, with a 
standard deviation of . 77. For the non impaired groups 
the mean number correct is 5.20, with a standard deviation 
of .66. The 2 X 3 analysis of variance conducted above (on 
total errors, or these mean values multiplied by six) 
indicates that these differences are significant, E (1,114). 
= 3.94, R < .0494. 
Hypothesis Five stated that an interaction would be 
found between diagnosis and neuropsychological impairments 
upon the ability to decode facial affects. This hypothesis 
was tested by examining the significance of the interaction 
term in the 2 X 3 E test conducted above. This interaction 
is not significant, F (2, 114) =3.62, R < .261. Therefore 
this hypothesis is not supported. 
Hypothesis Six stated that the neuropsychologically 
impaired schizophrenic group would show significantly more 
affect recognition errors than the non impaired schizophre-
nic group. Although Hypothesis Five, which predicted an 
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interaction between schizophrenia and neuropsychological 
dysfunction was not significant, this hypothesis can still 
be true if the composite results of both deficits are 
additive. To test this hypothesis, which makes an a priori 
prediction, a one-way analysis of variance testing between 
group differences is appropriate. In addition, such a test 
will maximize statistical power. (Had there been no prior 
theory behind this test more conservative post hoc statis-
tics would have been more appropriate). 
Despite this power, however, the analysis of variance is 
not significant, .[ (1, 38) = .0238, R < .8781. The mean 
number of correctly named affects by the neuropsychological 
impaired schizophrenic groups' errors was 28.55, with a 
standard deviation of 5. 0521. The mean of the non 
impaired schizophrenic group was 28. 800, with a standard 
deviation of 5.1870. Actually, the results were contrary 
to the hypothesis, although results were not significant. 
Therefore, this hypothesis is not supported. 
Regarding the question of accuracy of affect recogni-
tion, a post hoc exploration of patterns of recognition 
deficits between these six quasi-experimental groups might 
shed additional information of interest. As discussed above, 
to so involves some statistical risk of a Type I error, 
because there are no clear theories in advance predicting if 
specific emotions are more apt to be missed by specific 
groups. In the case of this type of "data snooping" an 
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appropriate procedure-wise adjustment to the alpha level 
should be made to minimize Type I error. 
Univariate one-way analyses of variance were run for 
each of the six emotions for the dependent variable of 
recognition accuracy. All of these F tests were adjusted 
with the Bonferoni procedure "hypothesis-wise" (Hays, 1981; 
that is divided by the number of tests run in this post hoc 
analysis. In this case again, one test for each emotional 
presented). 
Utilizing the procedure advanced by Kirk (1982) and 
others, if and only if the level of significance reaches the 
adjusted Bonferoni alpha-in this case .0083-additional post 
hoc statistics may be run and interpreted to attempt to 
explai:r:i sources of between-group differences. For this 
study post hoc group differences that are significant at 
this level were then examined by the Scheffe test (Winer, 
1971). The Scheffe test is the most conservative post hoc 
tests commonly utilized (Winer, 1971). 
The above procedure was performed on group differences 
on the dependent variable of affect decoding accuracy. Six 
separate analyses of variance were conducted, requiring an 
alpha level .05/6 or .0083 to warrant further between-group 
comparisons for group differences associated with particular 
emotions. Table 3 shows the results of these univariate 
tests, and whether the Bonferoni adjustments to the alpha 
levels were significant. 
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Table Three 
Analysis of Variance for Post Hoc Univariate Tests of 
Emotional Accuracy 
------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion !'. Significance level Significance with 
adjusted alpha 
Happiness 2.887 .017 no 
Sadness 1.435 .218 no 
Anger 3.803 .003 yes 
Fear 2.001 .083 no 
surprise 1.744 .131 no 
Disgust 2.081 .072 no 
Univariate Tests with (5, 114) degrees of freedom 
The six quasi-experimental groups 
themselves only for the emotion of anger. 
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differed among 
Since this is 
true, a Scheff e range test on the mean number of correct 
responses for this emotion may now be performed. The results 
of this test (Ranges = 4.79; R < .05) indicate that the non 
impaired schizophrenic group differs significantly from the 
non impaired affective disordered group. Non impaired 
schizophrenics are more likely to misidentify the emotion of 
anger than are non impaired affective patients. No other 
contrasts are significantly different. 
The next group of hypotheses require a second 2 X 3 
analysis of variance, this time with the dependent measure 
of subjective ratings of affect certainty. Table Four shows 
the means and standard deviations for each quasi-experimen-
tal group, and by independent variables of diagnosis and 
status of neuropsychological impairments. 
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Table Four 
Ratings of Certainty by Quasi-Experimental Subgroups 
------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion Mean and Standard Deviation 
Group Happy Sad Anger Fear Surprise Disgust 
------------------------------------------------------------Medical 31.95 30.65 29.75 28.90 30.25 28.15 
Non Impaired 7.28 6.89 7.04 7.94 6.29 6.76 
Medical 30.90 32.05 32.15 30.45 28.65 28.25 
Impaired 7.10 5.81 7.70 9.06 10.36 9.10 
Affective 30.05 25.65 29.15 31.45 28.50 29.60 
Non Impaired 10.32 9.54 8.67 5.90 8.90 7.51 
Affective 29.05 22.45 20.60 28.85 27.10 28.85 
Impaired 8.76 7.85 8.89 8.98 7.94 7.16 
Schizophrenic 26.95 29.90 31.55 16.25 29.75 29.30 
Non Impaired 8.70 10.33 6.87 16.01 10.03 9.03 
Schizophrenic 29.24 27.00 30.25 13.95 26.95 28.30 
Impaired 8.88 5.54 8.73 14.86 10.05 8.83 
------------Mean Total 29.24 27.95 28.90 24.97 28.81 28.74 
8.87 8.35 8.76 12.98 7.89 7.97 
Mean Medical 31.42 31.35 30.95 29.67 30.05 28.20 
7.21 6.35 7.38 8.44 6.52 7.91 
Mean 39.55 24.05 24.87 30.15 30.27 29.22 
Affective 9.45 8.78 9.69 7.61 7.86 7.22 
Mean Schizo- 26.75 28.45 30.85 15.10 26.12 28.89 
phrenic 9.46 8.32 7.79 15.33 8.36 8.83 
Mean Non 29.51 28.73 30.13 25.54 29.41 29.01 
Impaired 9.50 9.16 7.51 12.65 7.83 7.71 
Mean 28.97 27.16 27.66 24.41 28.21 28.46 
Impaired 8.30 7.52 9.75 13.40 7.97 8.27 
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Hypothesis Seven predicted that psychiatric diagnoses 
will have an effect on patient ratings of certainty of 
emotional recognition. The analysis of variance discussed 
above supports this hypothesis, .E (2, 114) =11.365, .2 < 
. 001. Again, however, this "omnibus" test does not isolate 
where differences lie. 
Hypothesis Eight predicted that schizophrenics will be 
more certain of the accuracy of their ratings than medical 
patients. Hypothesis Nine predicted that schizophrenics 
will be more certain of the accuracy of these ratings than 
patients with affective disorders. Medical patients 
produced an average (across all six emotions) total 
certainty rating of 181. 65, with a standard deviation of 
24. 54. Patients with affective disorders produced a mean 
certainty total of 168.12, and a standard deviation of 
29.34. Schizophrenic patients produced mean total certainty 
ratings of 156.10 with a standard deviation of 18.80. 
A Duncan's multiple range test (ranges =3.70, 3.86, 
individual comparison, R < .01) indicates that these two 
extreme groups differ from each other at the .05 level or 
greater. The medical group does not differ significantly 
from the affective group, nor does the affective group 
differ significantly from the schizophrenic group. Although 
one of these hypotheses produced significant results, the 
results are in the opposite direction from those predicted 
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by the hypothesis. Individuals without a psychiatric 
diagnosis rate themselves as most certain of the accuracy of 
their judgment regarding facial expressions. Those with 
affective disorders rate themselves as less certain about 
their judgment. Finally schizophrenics rate themselves as 
even less certain still. 
Hypothesis Ten predicted that there would be a main 
effect of neuropsychological impairments on the dependent 
measure of affect recognition certainty ratings. Non 
impaired subjects had a total mean rating of certainty of 
172.33, and a standard deviation of 23.12. Neuropsychologi-
cally impaired subjects had a mean total rating of 164.90, 
and a standard deviation of 29.35. This hypothesis was not 
supported, F (11, 114) = 2.895, R < .092. 
Hypothesis Eleven predicted a significant interaction 
between neuropsychological impairment and psychiatric 
diagnosis on subjective ratings of affect certainty. The 2 X 
3 analysis of variance indicates a significant interaction, 
E (1, 114) =3.268, P < .042. 
Hypothesis Twelve predicted that neuropsychologically 
impaired schizophrenics would show more subjective certainty 
regarding judgments of emotional accuracy than non impaired 
schizophrenics. However, schizophrenics with neuropsy-
chological impairment are less certain than schizophrenics 
without impairment. Total certainty ratings for schizo-
phrenics without neuropsychological impairment was 158.95 
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with a standard deviation of 17 .13. Schizophrenics with 
impairments had a mean total rating of 153. 25, and a 
standard deviation of 20.38. However, a univariate analysis 
of variance failed to find these groups significantly 
different F (1, 38) = .9167, R < .344. Therefore neither 
the direction predicted nor the significance of this 
hypothesis is supported. 
Post hoc data analysis is intensely useful, especially 
since several hypotheses failed to be supported, or were 
significant in the wrong direction. Table Five indicates the 
~ values for univariate tests on between group differences 
in ratings of certainty for each emotion, and the signif i-
cance of the F statistic both before and after the Bonf eroni 
adjustment. 
Utilizing the above univariate tests as necessary but 
not sufficient for the establishment of between group 
differences for particular emotions, it is seen that 
differences in certainty of sadness, anger and fear should 
be examined with a Scheffe test, again chosen because it is 
an exceedingly conservative measure. For the emotions of 
sadness and ratings of affect certainty, the Scheffe test 
(Ranges= 4. 79) found that the depressed, non impaired 
patients rated sad affects as less intense. No other group 
differences were significant. 
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Table Five 
Analysis of Variance for Post Hoc Univariate Tests ·of 
Emotions and Ratings of Certainty. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion I: Significance level Significance with 
adjusted alpha 
Happiness 1.188 .319 no 
Sadness 4.144 .002 yes 
Anger 5.508 .0001 yes 
Fear 9.722 .0001 yes 
surprise 2.774 .021 no 
Disgust .120 .990 no 
------------------------------------------------------------
Univariate Tests with (5, 114) degrees of freedom 
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For ratings of certainty of judgment regarding the 
emotion of anger, a Scheffe test (Range= 4.79) found that 
the depressed, non impaired group differed significantly 
from the remainders of the groups, and that other groups did 
not differ significantly. 
For subjective ratings of certainty of fear the two 
schizophrenic groups differed significantly from the remain-
der of the groups (Ranges =4.79). 
Hypothesis Thirteen predicted that the status of 
psychiatric diagnosis would have an effect on the ratings 
of perceived pleasantness of facial expressions. A 2 
(status of neuropsychological impairment) X 3 (diagnosis) 
analysis of variance was conducted on the dependent measure 
of ratings of affect pleasantness. A main effect was found 
for psychiatric diagnosis, F (2, 114) = 7.893, R, < .001. 
These results are highly significant. 
Table Six shows the mean values and standard deviations 
for subjective ratings of accuracy by each quasi experimen-
tal group. 
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Table Six 
Ratings of Pleasantness by Quasi-Experimental Subgroups 
------------------------------------------------------------
Group Happy 
Emotion Mean and standard Deviation 
Sad Anger Fear Sur- Dis-
prise gust 
------------------------------------------------------------Medical 36.25 
Non Impaired 4.10 
Medical 33.10 
Impaired 6.04 
Affective 32.25 
Non Impaired 4.72 
Affective 31.80 
Impaired 5.83 
Schizophrenic 32.35 
Non Impaired 9.32 
Schizophrenic 32.80 
Impaired 8.25 
Mean Total 33.09 
6.78 
Mean Medical 34.67 
5.34 
Mean Affec- 32.02 
tive 5.24 
Mean Schizo- 32.57 
phrenic 8.97 
Mean Non 33.61 
Impaired 6.64 
Mean 32.56 
Impaired 6.94 
16.90 13.25 13.65 30.25 14.15 
5.51 4.78 4.52 6.29 5.45 
19.85 16.00 17.45 28.65 22.45 
7.61 9.74 8.35 10.36 9.86 
15.90 15.15 13.50 28.50 15.90 
5.47 6.03 6.61 8.90 6.40 
19.00 17.45 16.75 27.10 19.45 
7.13 9.57 9.31 7.94 7.56 
24.00 23.00 14.95 29.75 26.00 
8.93 9.58 12.65 10.03 11.85 
21.75 24.45 11.65 26.95 25.10 
9.59 9.69 8.99 10.05 9.36 
19.57 18.21 14.65 28.53 20.50 
7.87 9.27 8.81 8.94 9.60 
18.37 14.62 15.55 29.45 18.30 
6.72 7.70 6.90 8.49 8.91 
17.47 16.30 15.12 27.80 17.67 
6.46 7.98 8.14 8.35 7.14 
22.88 23.72 13.30 28.30 25.50 
9.21 9.53 10.96 10.04 10.55 
18.95 17.13 14.03 29.50 18.68 
7.63 8.16 8.51 18.45 9.78 
20.20 19.30 15.28 27.57 22.33 
a.12 10.20 9.12 9.3a 9.13 
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Hypothesis Fourteen predicted that schizophrenics would 
rate slides of facial expression as less pleasant than 
medical patients rated them. Hypothesis Fifteen predicted 
that schizophrenics would rate slides of facial expression 
as less pleasant than patents with affective disorders rated 
the slides. Both of these hypotheses were tested simul-
taneously with a Duncan multiple range test (ranges =3.70, 
3. 86). The results of this test indicate that both the 
affective (mean =130.97, SD=25.41, and medical patients ( 
mean = 126.40, SD = 18.46) differ significantly from the 
schizophrenic group (mean = 134.53, SD = 25.16) but not 
from each other. These results are significant, though in 
the opposite direction than predicted. 
Hypothesis Sixteen predicted that the neuropsychologi-
cally impaired schizophrenics would differ in overall 
ratings of pleasantness compared with non impaired schizo-
phrenics. This was a specific hypothesis that lumped 
together both pleasant and unpleasant emotions, and 
predicted a unidirectional effect across each category. For 
impaired schizophrenics, the mean total ratings of pleasant-
ness of affect were 142. 70, with a standard deviation of 
27.455. For non impaired schizophrenics, the total mean 
ratings of certainty were 150.05, with a standard deviation 
of 26.280. Since this difference is in the opposite direc-
tion than it was hypothesized, this hypothesis is not 
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supported. Differences between the two groups, however, are 
not significant, E (1, 38) = .745, R < .393. 
Hypothesis Seventeen predicted that there would be a 
significant interaction between neuropsychological impair-
ment and schizophrenia on ratings of pleasantness of facial 
expression. The interaction was tested by the 2 X 3 
analysis of variance and was not significant, E (1, 114) = 
· .115, R < .115. 
Hypothesis Eighteen predicted that neuropsychological-
ly impaired schizophrenics would rate affects as less 
pleasant than non impaired schizophrenics. For the impaired 
schizophrenics, the mean rating of affect pleasantness was 
23.78, with a standard deviation of 4.57. For non deficit 
schizophrenics, the 
deviation of 4.39. 
mean rating was 25.00, with a standard 
An analysis of variance indicates that 
these differences, though in the predicted direction, are 
not significant, F (1, 38) = .74, R < .393. 
As in the two previous dependent variables, post hoc 
analysis is useful in ferreting out the specific types of 
emotion that are apt to be rated differentially pleasantly 
or unpleasantly by different quasi-experimental groups. 
Table Seven shows the result of Bonferoni univariate tests 
to determine whether a ~ hoc Scheff e procedure is 
warranted. 
Table Seven 
Analysis of Variance for Post Hoc Univariate Tests ·of 
Emotions and Ratings of Pleasantness 
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------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion 
Happiness 1.133 
Sadness 3.166 
Anger 5.633 
Fear 1.232 
· Surprise .439 
Disgust 6.235 
Significance level 
.347 
.010 
.001 
.300 
.820 
.001 
Significance with 
adjusted alpha 
no 
no 
yes 
no 
no 
yes 
106 
Two emotions-anger and disgust-are significant at the 
required . 008 level imposed by the Bonferoni adjustment. 
Post hoc Scheffe analyses were conducted for the effects of 
belonging to one of the six quasi-experimental groups on the 
dependent measures of ratings of pleasantness for the 
emotions of disgust and anger. For the dependent measure of 
subjective ratings of pleasantness of angry affects, the two 
schizophrenic groups differed significantly from the 
medical non impaired group (ranges = 4.79, R < .05). 
Furthermore the neuropsychologically impaired schizophrenic 
group differed significantly from the non impaired de-
pressed patients. An identical Scheffe test (ranges = 
4.79, R < .05) was conducted on differences of ratings of 
pleasantness for disgusted faces. The non impaired schizo-
phrenic group had the highest rating of pleasantness, and it 
is this group alone that differs significantly from the 
depressed non impaired group. 
Hypothesis Nineteen predicted that an unequal variance 
would be found between the psychiatric group and the pooled 
variances of the medical and affective groups. The hypothe-
sis of unequal variance was tested by Bartlett's test for 
homogeneity, a very sensitive test for heterogeneity of 
variance that is suited for unequal cell sizes (Winer, 
1971). The computation employed was Box's revision, 
distributed as an F ratio. This statistic is significant 
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when the variances between groups differ, with a level of 
.05 or less. 
The results of this test indicate the variances are not 
equal, E (1, 119) = 3.213, R < .04. However variance 
predictions were in the wrong direction. The medical group 
had a variance of 581. 02. The affective disordered 
patients had a variance of 531.99. The schizophrenic group 
had a variance of 265.99. Schizophrenics ·showed less 
variance in ratings of intensity, not more as was predicted. 
Hypothesis Twenty predicted that neuropsychologically 
impaired patients would rate facial affects as less subjec-
tively intense than non impaired patients. This was tested 
with a 2 (status of neuropsychological impaired) X 3 
(psychiatric diagnosis) analysis of variance. For patients 
with no neuropsychological impairments the mean total was 
27.35 with a standard deviation of 3.29. For patients with 
neuropsychological impairments the mean aggregate intensity 
rating was 28. 66, with a standard deviation of 4. 62. No 
main effect was found for the status of neuropsychological 
impairment, F (1,114) = .776, R < .380. Thus this hypothe-
sis is not supported. 
Although no prediction was made regarding the status of 
psychiatric diagnosis, an analysis of variance indicates 
that this independent variables is significant E (1, 114) 
= .009, P < .009. The medical patient group demonstrated 
the highest ratings of intensity (mean = 168. 05 SD = 
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24. 01) . Affective disordered patients showed the second 
highest level of intensity ratings (153.40, SD = 23.06). 
Schizophrenics showed the least subjective intensity ratings 
(153.42, SD= 16.03). The interaction between diagnosis and 
neuropsychological impairment was not significant, F ( 1, 
114) = 2.220, R < .113. 
Table Eight indicates the ratings of intensity for each 
emotion by each quasi experimental subgroup. 
The suspected finding that schizophrenia has an effect 
on subjective ratings of intensity can be seen from Table 
Eight. An admittedly post hoc multivariate analysis of 
variance was conducted on six dependent variable emotions. 
This test indicated that there are significant differences 
between these groups, Hotellings T = .73420, E (30, 537) = 
2.628, R < .001. At this point univariate statistics are 
appropriate to determine where the differences lie. 
Univariate E values; levels of significance, and 
Bonferoni adjustments for these post hoc analyses regarding 
intensity and particular emotions were also calculated. 
Since two emotions produce significant differences between 
quasi-experimental subgroups, a conservative post hoc test 
again is justified to attempt to isolate the sources of 
these differences. 
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Table Eight 
Ratings of Intensity by Quasi-Experimental Subgroups 
------------------------------------------------------------
Emotion Mean and standard Deviation 
Group Happy Sad Anger Fear Surprise Disgust 
------------------------------------------------------------
Medical 30.05 23.45 25.65 27.65 28.95 28.35 
Non Impaired 4.91 7.98 10.39 8.84 5.87 6.41 
Medical 30.70 28.95 28.75 28.30 28.35 26.95 
Impaired 6.50 8.02 8.74 11.31 8.85 8.30 
Affective 30.95 25.25 27.90 26.60 21.10 25.50 
Non Impaired 10.32 7.96 7.56 9.45 5.98 6.75 
Affective 29.20 20.30 24.95 26.20 29.10 23.10 
Impaired 7.56 6.51 6.21 11.01 8.00 8.25 
Schizophrenic 31.80 29.25 30.45 14.05 26.45 24.95 
Non Impaired 7.65 6.24 6.73 12.75 8.13 8.49 
Schizophrenic 29.20 28.50 27.50 11.50 27.90 25.30 
Impaired 6.57 7.31 7.37 11.27 8.05 7.42 
------------
Mean Total 30.31 25.95 27.53 22.38 28.07 25.70 
6.84 7.93 8.00 12.66 7.47 7.66 
Mean Medical 30.37 26.20 27.20 27.97 28.65 27.65 
5.70 8.38 9.61 10.02 7.42 7.35 
Mean Af f ec- 30.07 22.78 26.42 26.40 28.40 24.32 
tive 7.71 7.60 6.99 10.12 7.05 7.54 
Mean Schizo- 30.50 28.88 28.98 12.77 27.18 25.12 
phrenic 7.17 6.73 7.13 11.95 8.02 7.87 
Mean Non 30.93 25.98 30.13 22.76 27.70 26.28 
Impaired 6.89 7.71 7.51 12.04 6.70 7.35 
Mean Neuro 29.70 25.91 27.66 22.00 28.45 25.12 
Impaired 6.81 8.23 9.75 13.34 8.21 8.02 
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For the emotion of fear, a Scheffe test (ranges= 4.79) 
found significant differences between the two schizophre-
nic groups and the remaining four groups at the .OS level. 
The schizophrenic groups had a pooled mean intensity ratings 
for the emotion of fear of 12.77, with a standard deviation 
of 11.95. The nonschizophrenic groups had a total mean 
rating of 27.18, with a standard deviation of 10.07. 
The individual differences in group ratings regarding 
the intensity of the emotion of sadness is even more unex-
pected. An additional Scheffe test (range = 4.79) was 
conducted on the mean differences between groups for this 
emotion's ratings of intensities. The depressed, neuropsy-
chologically impaired group differed significantly at the 
.OS level from the schizophrenic groups and the medical 
neuropsychologically impaired group. 
CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
The Role of Neuropsychological Deficits in Schizophrenic 
Errors in Affect Recognition 
The major purpose of this dissertation was to determine 
whether facial affect recognition deficits found in schiz-
ophrenics could be accounted for by neuropsychological 
impairments. In this study schizophrenia and neuropsycholog-
ical impairment both were found to have a significant impact 
on patients' ability to correctly decode facial expressions, 
as previous literature has also found. However, there was 
neither an additive nor an interactive effect on the task of 
facial affect recognition in the schizophrenic 'group for the 
variable of neuropsychological impairment. Schizophrenics 
made the same number of errors whether they were neuropsy-
cholog ically impaired or not. 
If affect recognition deficits were entirely due to 
latent neuropsychological impairment, then the schizophren-
ics without such impairment should not have shown affect 
recognition deficits. 
deficits were entirely 
Furthermore, if affect recognition 
due to latent neuropsychological 
lll 
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impairment, then schizophrenics without neuropsychological 
damage should have shown less affect deficits than brain 
damaged individuals either with medical or affective disor-
ders. Neither result was found. 
Instead, neuropsychologically impaired schizophrenics 
performed no worse than non impaired schizophrenic subjects 
on a task that is known to be highly inf 1 uenced by neuro-
psycholog ical deficits. Viewing this finding from a 
different angle, it can be claimed-tongue-in-cheek, certain-
ly-that schizophrenia provides immunity to the effects of 
neuropsychological impairment on tasks of facial affect 
recognition! 
Potential Validity Problems 
The most common response when predictions go grossly 
contrary to hypotheses is to suggest measurement error, 
sample error, or other factors influencing the results in 
the unexpected direction. Cook and Campbell {1979) suggest 
such discussions be framed in the language of three types 
of validity: internal, external, and statistical conclusion 
validity. Internal validity refers to spurious manipula-
tions that impute causality where none is really present 
{Type I error), or more rarely obscures causality {TYpe II 
error). Threats to internal validity are caused by such 
phenomena as maturation, subject attrition, changing 
instrumentation and statistical regression. 
113 
One exception discussed by Cook and Campbell, possibly 
causing a Type II error, is the so called "ceiling" or 
"floor" effect. It is possible that the performance of 
schizophrenics was so poor that even with the main effect of 
neuropsychological impairment actually being present, test 
instrumentation was not sufficiently strong to override the 
decrement associated with schizophrenia. 
The possibility of this threat to internal validity 
existing can be assessed by utilizing the 
meta-analysis (Wolfe, 1986). A coefficient 
techniques of 
delta (Cohen, 
1977) can be calculated for the difference between schiz-
ophrenic and non schizophrenic performance on facial affect 
recognition8· For this study the differences between the 
medical control group and schizophrenic patients was g = 
.73. This means that on average the medical group performs 
.73 standard deviations better than the schizophrenic group. 
(According to Wolfe this is a moderate-to-above-average 
effect for social science literature). 
8 The formula for this is: delta = mean group 1 - mean 
group 2/ pooled standard deviation. This statistic gives us 
a useful comparison tool to view diverse studies conducted 
separately, and is interpretable as a measure of differences 
in standard deviations. Meta-analysis is a relatively new 
procedure (Wolfe, 1986), and alternative meta-analytic 
statements of effect size exist. Rosenthal, for example, 
utilizes the coefficient i: rafter than delta. Some meta-
analyses do not use pooled standard deviation estimates, and 
instead use the standard deviation of the control group. In 
the author's experience this usually results in an inflated 
effect size where homogeneity of variance is not a given. 
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However, it does not approximate a floor effect. A meta-
analysis by Johnson and Mccown (submitted) suggests such an 
effect size is relatively low for the type of task at hand. 
Typically, the effect size for schizophrenia on a task of 
facial affect recognition is above one standard deviation. 
For nonmedicated schizophrenics the effect size is often 
over three standard deviations, i. e. d = 3. 00, or four 
times that found in this study. Results in this study are 
on the low end of the meta-analytic distribution. Obviously, 
no floor effect was operating as past studies have found 
much greater effect sizes associated with schizophrenia. 
Perhaps the lack of magnitude of the .effect size is 
indicative of an instrumental insensitivity that failed to 
allow for an interaction between schizophrenia and neuro-
psychological deficits. Only 36 affects were presented. Some 
studies on affect recognition utilize three or four times as 
many stimuli. It is possible that affect recognition 
deficits are a function of test length as well as com-
plexity. Ability to decode affect might be a relatively 
exhausting task for those with brain impairments, and more 
of a main effect might be encountered on longer tests. 
Whether this argues for greater validity of longer 
affect recognition tests is uncertain. It should, however be 
noted that facial affect recognition is more impaired in 
"acute schizophrenics" and those not medicated. Johnson and 
Mccown (submitted) have shown that there is a significant 
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correlation between chronicity and reduced effect size. The 
values in this study are not as atypical if it is remembered 
that all of the patients in the schizophrenic groups were 
inpatients at a state hospital and heavily medicated. More 
will be said about this below in the discussion of external 
validity. 
Internal validity is also threatened when an unmeasured 
variable differentially represented in a group of interest 
has effects on the dependent measure that obscure those of 
the hypothesized independent variable. It is also possible 
that affect accuracy-apart from any brain deficits-is a 
practiced skill correlating with social network intensity or 
size. Schizophrenics probably offer very little socially, 
and would be expected to have few friends. Consequently, 
they would be expected to have the smallest, most insular 
networks, and might simply be out of practice for the 
ability to decode expressions. In this explanation the lack 
of social contacts would decrease opportunities for social 
learning. Prior neurological impairments in affect recogni-
tion would be completely overridden by the lack of practice 
due to no social contact. In this manner, neuropsychological 
deficits might have had a main effect, but the main effect 
would be overshadowed by the lack of social practice and 
learning opportunities. 
This is an intriguing line of reasoning, because it has 
potential importance for rehabilitation of schizophrenics. 
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First, it argues for the greater needs of half-way houses 
and other socialization programs for chronic schizophrenics 
who might benefit in their overall social skills functioning 
from simply being in the presence of other people. Secondly, 
it argues that neuropsychological deficits might still play 
an important role in comparative affect recognitions skills, 
though one that is overridden by the confounding variable of 
lack of practice. 
In this study two measures of social network were 
utilized, one of status of marriage, and the other of the 
number of people living with the patient.9 While the status 
of being married failed to correlate with affect recogni-
tion ( ~ = .113, R < .112) the number of people living in 
one's household was almost significantly correlated, ~ = 
.143, R < .053. The failure to find significance here is 
not particularly disheartening to those advocating the role 
of social support in affect recognition. The measures of 
social support employed in this study are very crude, and 
absolutely nothing is known about their validity apart from 
what is obvious at face value. 
A fruitful area of research might be to further assess 
the impact of such variables on affect decoding utilizing 
more sophisticated measures of social support. However, even 
9 Since many of the subjects were old and poor, this 
number is rather large in some cases. Differences in 
cultural norms between middle class Northern, urban 
families of majority cultures, and the rural poor should be 
recalled. 
117 
if social support were positively related to affect recogni-
tion, causality would be hard to sort out. It might be 
that those with no social skills find no one willing to live 
with them. On the other hand, an equally strong case can be 
made that individuals who do not live with significant 
others lose the ability to decode affects from lack of 
experience. Only a longitudinal study addressing changes in 
affect recognition and social support as a function of 
disease process can adequately answer this question. 
Cook and Campbell also discuss a general category of 
validity known as statistical conclusion validity. Accord-
ing to Cook and Campbell the first relevant issue regarding 
statistical conclusion validity involves statistical power. 
In~uff icient power can threaten statistical conclusion 
validity by causing Type II error. In this study the test 
utilized to compare differences between groups was a fac-
torial analysis of variance, a powerful test for detecting 
differences (Winer, 1971). Furthermore, ANOVAs are rela-
tively robust regarding violations from the normal dis-
tribution, another cause of statistical conclusion validity 
problems. 
Reliability is another relevant threat to statistical 
conclusion validity. Reliability of diagnostic categories 
was maximized by having multiple criteria in the operational 
definitions, such as by having a diagnostic team agree on 
DSM-III-R categorization, and by insistence on both 
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laboratory and psychometric data regarding neuropsychologi-
cal deficiencies. Reliability of measurements was attempted 
by utilizing scales with a high degree of formal psychomet-
ric reliability. 
Another cause of statistical conclusion validity 
problems is labeled by Cook and Campbell ( 1979) as "random 
irrelevancies in the experimental setting'~ • To some extent 
this problem was controlled by utilizing two diagnostic 
groups of psychiatric patients (affective disorders and 
schizophrenics). Testing was done in the same locations for 
each group. Yet care should be taken in interpreting these 
results. Schizophrenics are notoriously difficult to test, 
especially while sufficiently impaired to require an 
inpatient, acute treatment milieu. Attentional factors 
operating in the schizophrenic groups could have interacted 
with unknown confounds in the environment to distort any 
possible findings. 
An additional statistical conclusion validity problem 
exists regarding hypothesis concerning affect pleasantness, 
certainty and intensity. In retrospect the procedure 
utilized allowed for a tremendous amount of error variance. 
This procedure used aggregate measures of these variables as 
comparison units, since directionality was hypothesized. The 
problem with this measure is that it may have failed to find 
more subtle differences. 
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An example is appropriate. If particular slides were 
rated as 11 2 11 and 11 7 11 by normal patients, and "7" and 11 2 11 
by schizophrenics, individual differences cancel out with 
the method employed. A statistical analysis that utilized 
absolute value might have highlighted differences, although 
it also would have made directionality harder to study, 
perhaps requiring a dichotomously coded statistical test 
which would have been less powerful. With hindsight as 
experience, power to detect differences might have been more 
important than power to detect directionality of differen-
ces. 
A number of threats to external validity also exist in 
this study. The overall low intelligence level of this 
sample might have depressed levels of significance for any 
of the affect recognition variables. Certainly, this sample 
is atypical. It was drawn from one of the most economically 
depressed communities in the country. A cycle of poverty and 
lack of educational opportunity is chronic. Poor nutrition 
and lack of prenatal and other medical care may operate to 
reduce potential intellectual acumen of both medical and 
psychiatric patients utilizing hospital services. As many 
as 75% of patients at this sample site are "functionally" 
illiterate, being limited to fourth grade reading skills or 
less. Many of the patients tested were severely ill physi-
cally, which may have also reduced the effect size. 
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It is also notable that most subjects were minorities 
and the researcher is a member of the dominant culture. This 
might have affected the study results, increasing· error 
variance, and hence reducing sensitivity of the instruments 
employed. Rosenthal et al. (1979) have commented on the 
confusion in the literature regarding whether minorities can 
detect nonverbal affects of dominant cultural members as 
well as they can members of their own cultures. In all 
likelihood, there are great individual differences in the 
application of this skill by minorities across situations. 
These differences would likely be due to specific ideogra-
phic historical factors, and atypical lifetime oppor-
tunities, such as employment patterns, neighborhoods lived 
in, successful and pleasant experiences with members of 
majority cultures, etc. 
Such uncontrolled potentiality could easily increase the 
error variance and decrease any differences between groups 
likely to be found. A weakness of this study was not 
replicating it with diverse cultural groups, or splitting 
the sample into different socioeconomic groups. on the 
other hand both subject race and socioeconomic status failed 
to correlate with any of the dependent variables. 
Alternative Explanations 
A less cultural and more neurological answer regarding 
the failure to find a main effect for neuropsychological 
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impairment may also be appropriate. This argument is a bit 
more speculative, but finds some support in the literature. 
It suggests that several disparate areas of the brain ·may be 
involved in neural processing of affects. The nondorninant 
hemisphere might be necessary for primary reception, but not 
sufficient for sensory integration and the establishment of 
meaning. 
Luria (1963) has essentially solved the equipotentiality 
vs. localization controversy by demonstrating that diverse 
and disproximate neural locations combine together to form 
functional systems. For example, Luria has shown that while 
it is true that voluntary motoric movement involved in 
writing may localize to the primary motor strip, afferent 
and efferent neurons connect with areas as diverse as the 
cerebellum, the occipital lobes, Broca's area, and the 
right parietal areas. Damage to any of these areas can 
destroy the functional system, even if the integrative and 
executive areas-the tertiary areas in Luria's system-remain 
intact. 
It is possible that some of the primary or subintegra-
tive areas of affect processing involve neuropsychological 
functioning other than in the right hemisphere, the typical 
area suspected of localization of facial affect recognition 
(Cicone, et. al, 1980). This might be especially true when 
the experimental task involves a verbal labeling of the 
affects presented. There is some evidence for this diverse 
122 
lateralization and localization argument. Dekosky et al. 
(1980) found that while not as impaired as right hemispheric 
brain damaged patients, left hemisphere damaged patients 
were significantly more impaired on two tasks of facial 
affect recognition than neurological patients utilized as 
controls. From this it seems that both hemispheres are 
important for correct facial affect decoding, and not only 
the right hemisphere, as some authors has assumed. 
If this is the case then accurate transmission between 
hemispheres would be essential for correct decoding of 
facial expressions. Damage to either hemisphere or to 
connecting fibers (the corpus callosum), could cause 
deficits in affect recognition. This point seems to have 
been missed by previous researchers. 
During the review of the literature the hypothesized 
relationship between schizophrenia and corpus callosum 
deficits was discussed. As noted earlier, Bigelow, Nasral-
lah, and Rauscher (1983) have presented autopsy evidence 
suggesting that the corpus callosa of schizophrenics is 
often enlarged. As Andreasen (1985) argues, aberrant corpus 
callosa would result in a case where the two hemispheres 
were not able to communicate well with one another, result-
ing in a decay of information processing en route to or from 
the dominant hemisphere. Similar arguments about the 
necessity of correct hemispheric synchronization are 
advanced by Green, Hallet, and Hunter (1983). 
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In the case of schizophrenics without noted neuro-
psychological impairment but with interhemispheric process-
ing difficulties the reception of appropriate ·facial 
expressions might be possible, as well as the preliminary 
decoding and pattern analysis that appears to be a right 
hemispheric task. However, integration and interpretation of 
these emotions might be absent. This deficit would tend to 
overshadow any additional receptive or localized deficits, 
particularly those involving right hemispheric functioning. 
The trickle of water caused by brain damage would be ir-
relevant because the damage of schizophrenia has destroyed 
the pipelines. 
Since none of the neuropsychological tests administered 
were particularly sensitive to interhemispheric communica-
tion, this theory has additional credence. If schizophre-
nia is related to difficulties in interhemispheric process-
ing, subjects who show more deficits on cross-modality 
neuropsychological tests, for example, on dichotic listening 
procedures, (Green, Hallet & Hunter, 1983) should show more 
deficits in affect recognition. This is an interesting 
hypothesis that remains to be tested. 
Furthermore, the measure of affect recognition in this 
study involved verbal matching of affects with names. This 
is a left hemisphere function that might be more disturbed 
in schizophrenics if corpus callosum deficits are present. 
Right hemispheric understanding of a particular stimulus 
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. . 
might well be accomplished, but the right hemisphere might 
not be able to communicate this information to the left 
hemisphere in an effective and timely manner. In this way, 
tasks that did not involve verbal labeling of emotions, but 
that did involve emotional recognition might be performed 
better by schizophrenics than those that did involve verbal 
labeling. Procedures such as those utilized by Mandal 
(1986) are an example of such affect recognition tasks that 
do not involve verbal labels. 
A very interesting experiment is suggested by the above 
arguments. If difficulties in interhemispheric message 
transmission are responsible for comparative deficits in 
schizophrenics' inability to decode facial affects then 
schizophrenics without neuropsychological deficits should be 
more aware, on some level, of which affects they were 
seeing. They might not be able to communicate this aware-
ness. They might not even be aware of their understanding. 
They would be similar to the "split brain" patients studied 
by Sperry (1968) who point to an object they have seen 
before but cannot identify it verbally or admit that they 
were aware of their knowledge. 
However, schizophrenics with brain damage, particularly 
right hemispheric damage, would show less of this decoding 
skill on nonverbal tasks. Furthermore, they might be 
expected to show less Galvanic Skin Responses in the 
presence of affects for which they have been reinforced 
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previously. This might be true even though their total 
recognition scores on tasks involving verbal categorizing 
was no worse than the previous group of schizophrenics~ 
There is an extensive clinical lore regarding the 
supposed nonverbal sensitivity of schizophrenics. Arguments 
of this type state that schizophrenics are imbued with 
unusual emotional discernment regarding the feelings of 
others, the stress of which might, in fact, be responsible 
for their psychosis. While this argument is unsupported in 
the literature, it might have an interesting corollary with 
the present research. 
If schizophrenics are 
one hemisphere, yet are 
awareness, a good deal 
encountered. This might 
"aware" of emotional affects in 
unable to act fully upon this 
of social frustration might be 
lead to social avoidance often 
characteristic of this disorder, as well as the suspicious-
ness of others often seen. It is possible that in social 
situations the schizophrenic gets a set of signals from his 
right brain, and he is unable to verify the reality of 
their content, or even fully verbalize them. He is left 
with a weird feeling of anomalous dread, with occasional 
intrusions from apophanous social thoughts that have no way 
of being verified in reality. 
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Affect Certainty 
Regarding affect certainty, the effects of schizophrenia 
were in the opposite direction than those predicted. The 
findings here contradict a pilot study which found that 
outpatient psychiatric subjects rated expressions as more 
certain about their affect choices if they had a higher "P", 
or psychoticism factor. For this entire sample, Psychoticisrn 
correlates -.182 (R < .02) with ratings of affect certain-
ty. Eysenck and Eysenck (1985) have argued that P is the 
original diathesis for schizophrenia, although not the 
precipitant or a direct measure of the disease. Through a 
pathological process not known at this time, individuals 
high on P apparently are also at risk for schizophrenia and 
manic depressive illness. Either another gene, a pathologi-
cal agent, or a psychic trauma might be necessary to put 
those at risk due to high P over the edge towards diag-
nosable schizophrenia. Outpatients who might have been high 
P but were not schizophrenics might demonstrate affect 
certainty due to factors associated with psychoticism as a 
variable of personality. Schizophrenics, who also have high 
P, might demonstrate affect uncertainty, due to specific 
neurological problems secondary to the onset of their 
disease. 
One solution for this contradiction is that P might not 
be as relevant to schizophrenia as other variables, a 
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criticism leveled by Block (1977) and others who believe it 
is simply a genetic covariant associated with downward drift 
encountered in mate availability by schizophrenics.· This 
argument states essentially that criminality and interper-
sonal hostility associated with p places people in an 
economic disadvantage, where they frequently intermarry 
with individuals who are genetically loaded for schizo-
phrenia. On the other hand, the second psychoticism measure 
derived from the Whitaker Index also correlated negatively 
with affect certainty, ( r =- .156, l2 < • 044) • This is a 
direct index of schizophrenic thinking and its correlation 
with P (r =.421, R < .001) lends support to the Eysenck's 
theory of a normally distributed trait being responsible for 
schizophrenic diathesis. It also suggests that schizophrenic 
symptoms, as measured by the Whitaker Index, is associated 
with less affect certainty. These findings are in agreement 
with Livesay's (1981), who found that schizophrenics were 
much less certain of social judgment than non schizophren-
ics. 
The obvious suggestion is that in addition to a high P 
factor, to become schizophrenic an individual also needs to 
have a deficit in interhemispheric communications. Inter-
hemispheric difficulties could also cause a situation where 
individuals were less certain of their judgments of emo-
tions. High P in individuals who are not schizophrenic 
may correlate with affect certainty, while inter hem is-
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pheric discoupling (which is often associated with high P) 
might be related to less affect recognition certainty. 
Another explanation might be that P is curvilinearly 
related to certainty of affect recognition. 
Perhaps under the loci of a specific gene responsible 
for turning on the full diathesis of P (Eysenck & Eysenck, 
1985) the toughmindedness of this variable translated into 
an opponent process following repeated instances of 
stimulus presentation. Evidence regarding this possibility 
has been furnished by Claridge (1981). Claridge has iden-
tified the "phenomena of reverse covariation" in in-
dividuals, including schizophrenics who score high on the 
Eysencks' P scale. Claridge provides evidence that the 
psychophysical properties of. Psychoticism are related to the 
tendency of the high P individual to form a stimulus 
discoupling characterized by essentially a reverse physiolo-
gical response to that evoked in the individual upon initial 
stimulus presentation. Low P individuals habituate to loud 
stimuli following repeated presentations, whereas high P 
individuals show indices of relaxation below prestimulus 
baseline. It is possible that given the repetitive nature of 
the task at hand, subjects with extremely high P began to 
form opponent responses to those initially voiced, another 
manifestation of the "reverse covariation" phenomena. More 
research is needed to uncover the relationship between P and 
the tendency to form opponent responses. 
Still another possibility is that 
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the medications 
involved or the social stigma of being in a hospital 
weakened the feelings of certainty regarding affect recogni-
tion in individuals who would otherwise be more certain and 
toughminded regarding their judgments. This will be dis-
cussed below. 
It is surprising that neuropsychological impairment had 
no effects on certainty. The interaction found was in the 
wrong direction. The most obvious explanation here is that 
certainty is related more to premorbid personality factors 
and situational settings than any neuropsychological 
function that was assessed with this battery. 
An interaction was found between brain damage and 
schizophrenia on the variable of affect certainty. The 
interaction was in the wrong direction from that predicted. 
No immediate explanation is indicated in the literature. 
Perhaps the causal agent associated with this interaction, 
and even main effect is not neuropsychological or schizo-
phrenic damage but the loss of confidence that comes from 
being hospitalized and stigmatized. Neuropsychologically 
impaired schizophrenics and those who had been in the 
hospital for longer periods of time may have absorbed 
feelings that they are incompetent or otherwise incapable of 
adequate reality testing. Consequently they would be 
reacting in response to the demand characteristics of 
their community. 
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One variable in this study supports this line of reason-
ing. The number of times an individual had been psychiatri-
cally hospitalized was a significant covariant in a post 
hoc . ANOVA measuring the effects of quasi-experimental 
group membership on affect certainty, E (1, 110 = 6.067, p 
< .015. However, two problems arise with direct interpreta-
tion of this covariance. First is its obvious ex post 
facto discovery, and as such needs the appropriate suspi-
ciousness afforded to such findings until it is replicated 
in a study where it is predicted in advance. The second is 
that it is reasonable to assume that the number of times 
persons have been hospitalized is linearly related to the 
severity of their schizophrenia. However, the role of social 
support and "institutionalization" remain topics worthy of 
further research. 
Unfortunately, this study did not include sufficient 
numbers of "acute" schizophrenics to compare the length of 
hospitalization with affect recognition or certainty vari-
ables. current psychiatric nomenclature (DSM-III-R, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987) has eliminated the diagnosis 
of acute schizophrenia. By definition such patients (who are 
now labeled as brief psychotic reaction or schizophrenif orm 
disorder) are not included in this study. They simply do not 
fit the definitional criteria. 
The hypothesis that affect certainty is related to social 
support variables is not, however, supported by the post hoc 
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analysis of the data available in this study. Marital status 
failed to correlate significantly with affect certainty 
(.t:= • 008, P < • 455) • The number of people in a patient's 
household also failed to correlate significantly with affect 
certainty ( .t: = -.205, R < .392). These are extremely crude 
measures of social support, and clearly more exacting, and 
perhaps multidimensional assessment might be of use. 
Affect Pleasantness 
The next variable studied was affect pleasantness. A 
main effect was observed for psychiatric diagnosis, although 
it was in the opposite direction from that predicted. 
Implicit in the hypothesis was a theorized component similar 
to psychodynamic projection. The assumption was that the 
schizophrenic subject feels hostile and suspicious towards 
the world, and consequently rates social stimuli more 
negatively and less pleasantly across all situations. 
Perhaps what is occurring is a reverse situation where 
the individual compares outward stimuli to his own state. 
Rather than project, schizophrenics might compare. In this 
process, an internal standard of self-reference is implicit-
ly utilized in the judgement of the external world. 
According to this theory, by comparison with more normal 
individuals schizophrenics would tend to rate affects more 
pleasantly, since their own point of comparison-their own 
internal experiences-are elevated in the · direction of 
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unpleasantness. It is not denied that projections occur, 
but that under some circumstances, judgement by self-
reference provides for social assessments antithetical to a 
person's states or traits. This is an interesting area of 
research that could easily be expanded by the utilization 
of induction of mood and ratings of affect pleasantness. 
An additional look at the data in the study suggests 
another explanation for why the hypothesis was not sup-
ported. Schizophrenics fail to "adjust" their perceptions 
of pleasantness for the emotions of anger and disgust. As 
the post hoc tests indicated, these emotions are rated 
differently by the quasi-experimental groups. In the 
schizophrenic groups there is a lack of discrimination of 
these unpleasant emotions. These unpleasant emotions are 
rated as pleasant as other emotions are by schizophrenics, 
whereas non schizophrenics seem to make more of a dif f eren-
tial response. 
Whether this is due to response set, attention, or 
dynamic factors is unknown. However, the idea that schizo-
phrenia is associated with a total rejection of the dimen-
sion of unpleasantness is not supported, since they seem to 
rate fear as reasonably unpleasant. Ratings of pleasantness 
of the emotion of fear do not differ significantly from 
those made by the other diagnostic groups. In fact, 
schizophrenics rated fear as the least pleasant of all of 
the groups, although differences were not significant. 
133 
Perhaps because of their personal experiences with fear 
they related it as less pleasant than those whose experience 
is more vicarious. 
To some extent these findings contradict those of Mandal 
(1986). Mandal had schizophrenics and normal patients rate 
affects on a multidimensional scaling task that avoided 
direct verbal labels, Dimensions were collapsed through 
factor analysis. The pleasantness dimension was absent for 
schizophrenics. The nonschizophrenic groups failed to 
demonstrate the collapsing of this dimension. Mandal 
concludes that schizophrenics are markedly less aware of the 
pleasantness/unpleasantness distinction, at least in a 
multidimensional scaling procedure. The present findings 
suggest that schizophrenics are rejecting, or nondis-
criminatory of unpleasant emotions only. This implies 
perceptual awareness, and probably unconscious rejection, an 
altogether different finding than Mandal's claim that 
schizophrenics attenuate this dimension. 
The key to solving this apparent contradiction would 
seem to be in the method employed. In this study, as well 
as most studies on affect recognition, clear anchoring 
phrases and faces are presented. In Mandal's study the 
multidimensional scaling did not utilize these verbal cues. 
It is quite possible that in the absence of external cues, 
schizophrenics rate facial expressions as less pleasant, or 
even ignore the emotional 
hedonic responses altogether. 
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dimension associated with 
However, in the presence of external cues-and perhaps 
the fact of hospitalization-schizophrenics overcompensate. 
It is even possible that in the absence of clear cues 
projection is utilized, while in the presence, subject self 
reference is evoked. In social psychological literature, a 
consistent trend has emphasized the important of verbally 
mediated responses to environmental cues in determining 
attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). "Cognitive 
response theory" realizes that different processes of 
attitude change exist. Making people think about a topic-
even by drawing attention to it discretely-produces a 
different degree of attitude formation than if internal 
verbalizations are not present. This is probably true for 
affect recognition and ratings of affect qualities as well. 
Introducing verbal categories and choices forces a more 
conscious process onto the task that might not have been 
present otherwise. 
Neuropsychological impairment had no effect on affect 
pleasantness in this study. This is surprising. The rela-
tionship between affect pleasantness and impairment was 
suspected of being maximized by individuals with right 
hemispheric damage who generally display "a behavioral 
mosaic of mood !ability, dysthymic neurosis, and depression 
" (Fromm-Auch, 1983, p. 83). This is in contrast to patients 
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with left hemispheric damage who are more likely to show 
pathological ebullience. 
It is possible that since the number of focal lesion 
patients with a clear right or left lesion were approximate-
ly, the same, differences cancelled out. To test this 
hypothesis a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance was con-
ducted on the 22 patients with focal lesions. Of these nine 
were right hemispheric, seven were left hemispheric, and 
the remainder were frontal lobe disorders. Differences were 
not significant, F (2, 21) = .546, R < .56. This of course 
simply could be due to the small sample size employed. 
Internal validity of the present findings may be com-
promised by what Cook and Campbell (1979) have labeled 
"method bias". Etcoff ( 1983) found that left hemispheric 
brain damage produced impairment in perceptions of affect 
pleasantness. Her . method employed was a multidimensional 
scaling task without verbal referents. Again, it is 
possible that without such anchor points brain damaged 
subjects-at least those with left hemispheric damage-
minimize the pleasantness of affects presented operating on 
projection rather than social context or comparison. Perhaps 
the left hemisphere or the frontal lobes acts as a check, 
integrating social desirability factors and obvious stimuli 
context into a more pleasant oriented perception. 
If this is the case for either schizophrenics or neuro-
psychologically impaired individuals we might find a social-
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evaluative component "censoring" initial perceptions. This 
hypothetical process could best be examined by a twofold 
experiment which had subjects make multidimensional. judg-
ments of pleasantness, without verbal referents and then had 
them perform more left hemispheric, integrative task of 
rating pleasantness directly and verbally. It would be 
expected that schizophrenics and subjects with brain damage 
would show more differences between these two measures 
(less correlation) than other subjects. Again, this is an 
interesting area for additional research. 
Affect Intensity 
The final variable examined in this study was affect 
intensity. It was expected that schizophrenics would behave 
more idiosyncratically. This was not supported by the 
findings. Schizophrenics rated affects as less intense than 
medical patients or affective (depressed) patients. 
Furthermore, they showed less variance in ratings. 
These findings are in line with those of Claridge 
(1981), who found that schizophrenics attenuate portions of 
stimuli. Initially they appear to contradict other general 
findings in the literature on schizophrenics. An example is 
the extensive work of Mednick (1974), who presents convinc-
ing arguments that schizophrenics are characterized by a 
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condition of overarousa1.lO On a multidimensional scaling 
task, Mandal found that schizophrenics were overly sensitive 
to the dimension of arousal or intensity. Again, this. would 
seem to be a contradiction between multi-dimensional scaling 
methods and category presentation methods, such as the one 
employed in this study. 
The major source of the difference between schizophrenic 
and nonschizophrenic groups in this study, according to post 
hoc tests, was with the emotion of fear, which schizophren-
ics did not see as intense at all. A similar phenomena is 
found with the neuropsychologically impaired depressed, who 
did not see sadness as an intense emotion. An obvious 
hypothesis for further testing is that schizophrenics, and 
perhaps to a lesser extent, depressive patients, block out 
or repress the intense emotions of others in their environ-
ment that would tend to magnify their own negative states. 
Because schizophrenics are overaroused, they attenuate. For 
schizophrenics, fear is overwhelming, all other emotions 
pale by comparison. Consequently, they reject the emotion. 
This hypothesis can be synthesized with those of Mandal, 
who believes schizophrenics are overly dependent upon the 
arousal dimension for affect categorization. Perhaps because 
they are internally hypersensitized to this dimension, they 
tend to reject obvious stimuli that are intense. Perceptual 
10 However, Mednick's sample was obtained prior to DSM-
III, when the definition of schizophrenia has changed. 
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acknowledgement and cognitive processing of these stimuli 
would place them at a much greater arousal level. Evidence 
regarding this was furnished by Doughtery, Bartlett,· Izard 
( 197 4) • These authors found that schizophrenics were 
particularly upset after viewing angry or fear facial 
expressions. Apparently, normal subjects can look at an 
angry face, and say, "Yes, it is aroused and intense". If 
schizophrenics-who are very sensitive to this emotional 
dimension-did so their naturally aroused conditions would 
become overstimulated. 
Another explanation is also possible. What appears to be 
happening in these situations is that judgments of intensity 
are clearly made on the basis of comparison of internal 
states, rather than as projections. The groups that were the 
most fearful-the schizophrenics-minimized the intensity of 
the affect of fear. The group that was probably the saddest-
the patients with depression and strokes, or depression 
and early onset dementia, also "knew" what intense sadness 
was like. And they grasped the fact that the pictures they 
were seeing-intended to invoke an intense affect with which 
they were intimately familiar-failed markedly at this task 
compared to their own depths of feeling. 
Further testing of the hypothesis that verbal mediation 
invokes internal comparison, while nonmediation involves 
projection could be accomplished with patients on these 
extremes. Depressed neuropsychological impaired patients and 
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schizophrenics could be given a multidimensional sealing 
test to determine whether they accentuate or minimize the 
dimension of intensity for either sadness or fear respec-
tively. Standardized scores could then be compared with 
performance on a task where verbal labeling or an anchor 
point is involved. It would be expected that for tasks not 
involving verbal labeling, the dramatic rejection of 
intensity for these two affects would not likely be found. 
Conclusion 
One of the major goals of this study was to demonstrate 
that some of the social deficits schizophrenics display were 
directly explainable by neuropsychological knowledge 
presently within our arsenal. However, this was i;iot the 
case. Like most studies, this one invoked more questions 
than it answered. 
Affect recognition is a complex, multivariate phenomena 
with results clearly dependent not only upon what type of 
questions are asked, but what tools are used to answer these 
questions. Probably, the most important conclusion of this 
study is that the study of how well different diagnostic 
groups decode facial expressions can generate many fas-
cinating testable hypotheses regarding brain functioning, 
perceptual processes and the nature of mental illnesses. It 
is hoped that the complexity of this area will not serve to 
discourage future interest. 
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